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Introduction
This doctoral dissertation consists of three theoretical articles with a common
interest in the creation of interconnections in an economy and the role of these
interconnections in spreading bad shocks. The spread of bad shocks has been
explored in economics literature mainly in the context of contagious bank runs
but the following articles focus on different aspects of economy where the effects
of deterioration of an economy’s characteristics occur.
Interconnections in economies are often necessary for production or they
serve as an insurance tool but they at the same time expose the economy to a
possible spread of damage. The mechanism is very simple. A negative shock
that hits one agent in the economy can spread through interconnections in the
economy, such as financial linkages between banks, supply linkages between
firms, or personal linkages, like marriage, between agents.
In the following models I study optimal creation of interconnections in two
different types of economy and I also study properties of an interconnected
economy in general equilibrium.
In the first article I propose a general equilibrium model of an economy where
firms are connected through supply linkages crucial for their production. I study
the properties of the proposed model and compare it to a benchmark model
without linkages. The model with supply linkages exhibits lower aggregate level
of production but in case of increase of individual fluctuations of firms the
supply linkages help to boost aggregate production, i.e. the production can be
increasing at the margin while it is always decreasing in the benchmark model.
The second and the third article are theoretical matching models. In the
second article I construct a model in which agents search for partners to establish
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a pair interaction that brings them profit. The agents differ in their probabilities
of exit from the economy. The composition of every pair determines its expected
lifetime and profits the agents have from the interaction. The model allows for
the study of equilibrium properties of the matching market with entry and exit
of agents. Optimal individual decisions of accepting or rejecting each particular
type of match are analyzed. It is shown that for a certain range of parameters
multiple equilibria exits. Social optimality of agents’ decisions is assessed and
it is shown that for a range of parameters the social planner is able to impose
Pareto improving matchings.
The third article is a matching model between firms and workers. Workers do
not differ in their productivity but they differ in their probability of leaving the
labor force. Firms choose whether to accept a match with workers depending
on their type and they also choose whether and when to fire them. A stationary
situation of the economy is considered. It is shown that several types of stable
matching can be a stable stationary equilibrium of the economy depending on
the parameters of the model. Multiplicity of equilibria occurs for some ranges
of parameters. Stable matchings chosen by the agents are shown to be almost
always socially suboptimal. The planner’s solution is never Pareto improving
for the agents.
6
Contents
1 Supply Linkages Creation - a General Equilibrium Approach 11
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.2 The Economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.2.1 Workers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2.2 Intermediary Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.2.3 Final Production Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.3 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.3.1 General Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3.2 Specific Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.4.1 Comparison with Benchmark Model . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.4.2 Comparative Statics of the Model with Linkages . . . . . 36
1.5 Conclusions and Possible Extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.A Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
1.A.1 Sensitivity of the Model w.r.t. Parameters . . . . . . . . . 40
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
7
2 Stable Matchings in an Economy with Strong and Weak Agents 43
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
2.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
2.2.1 The Bargaining Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.2.2 Values and Distributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.2.3 Stable Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
2.2.4 Multiple Stable Equilibria, Pareto Dominance . . . . . . . 54
2.2.5 Social Optimality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
2.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.3.1 Results of Agents’ Optimal Decisions: . . . . . . . . . . . 56
2.3.2 Results of Planner’s Optimal Decisions: . . . . . . . . . . 61
2.4 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
2.A Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.A.1 Results for the Stationary Distribution . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.A.2 Summary of the Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.A.3 Plots of Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
3 Stable Firm-Worker Matchings in an Economy with Ageing
Workers 75
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.2 The Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
3.2.1 The Bargaining Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
3.2.2 Values and Distributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.2.3 Stable Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3.2.4 Multiple Stable Equilibria and Pareto Dominance . . . . . 87
3.2.5 Social Optimality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
3.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
3.3.1 Results of Agents’ Optimal Decisions: . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.3.2 Results of Planner’s Optimal Decisions: . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.4 Final Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
3.A Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
3.A.1 Summary of the Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
8
3.A.2 Plots of Equilibria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
9
10
Chapter 1
Supply Linkages Creation -
a General Equilibrium
Approach
1.1 Introduction
This paper studies an equilibrium model of an economy where for an exchange
between firms they need to have a specific exchange relationship. In standard
macroeconomic literature the exchange between firms happens through a mar-
ket without any special arrangements. Every period the given firm goes to the
market to find a firm to exchange with, without questioning its identity. Microe-
conomic literature has often a more complicated view on exchange, considering
repeated exchange between two specific firms and all the arrangements that can
exist between them. In his paper Ben-Porath [2] describes it as follows: “Par-
ties to a transaction can establish rules or norms for their exchange relationship,
a common view concerning contingencies, and procedures for settling disputes
that can serve them beyond a single transaction. The cost of negotiating and
establishing these rules will have to be incurred again if the parties change.”
Recently also macroeconomists are not completely satisfied with their simpli-
fied picture of firms’ exchange and have started to consider firms organized in
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networks rather than anonymous markets.
Relationships between firms can, of course, be of very different nature, go-
ing from really tight to really loose financial, commercial or other types of
relationships. These different arrangements are often described as Hybrid Or-
ganizations [16]. Despite the fact that there is a whole literature dedicated to
theory of hybrid forms of firms, due to confidentiality of business data there are
only a few empirical studies dealing with the topic.
In France, in 2003, the Ministry of Economy, Finance and Industry organized
a Survey of inter-firm relations [18]. This survey provides a strong evidence of
inter-firm relations: “In industrial groups 82% of producers are organized in
a system of cooperation among firms.” The survey shows not only that firms
tend to enter industrial relationships, but also that they tend to stay in them. It
shows that 52% of relations of independent industrial firms last for more than 5
years. This number is valid for relationships outside of industrial groups. Inside
the groups it is up to 79% of relationships that last for more than 5 years.
For the United States there exists an empirical study by Lafontaine and
Shaw [14] focused on franchises, one specific form of hybrid organization. They
show on their sample of almost twelve thousands firms that the mean for the
duration of franchising is 9.4 years. Moreover, this paper also clearly shows that
relationships between firms are costly to establish. In this context a franchise
fee needs to be payed to establish the relationship. The mean of franchise fees
for the given sample of firms is 23 300 US dollars.
The evidence above only confirms a generally accepted idea that inter-firm
relations are common and they have often long term character. In this light
the market of firms where each period firms find a new exchange partner does
not seem to be an entirely appropriate model of a real economy. The following
paper proposes a new step from standard economic theory towards a model of
an economy with firms interconnected by long term linkages.
A simple dynamic model of economy with heterogeneous firms building sup-
ply linkages is presented. The linkages are a necessity for one specific type of
exchange in the economy. Building linkages is costly but the linkages can per-
sist over time. Heterogeneity of firms causes that sometimes linkages have to
be newly constructed. The aim of the model is to explore the properties of the
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economy with linkages in a steady state when compared to a standard economy.
Because the aim is to capture purely the effect of building linkages, we assume
a very simple setting with no storage technology available in the economy. This
allows us to study the effect of building linkages isolated because the possibility
of storage would have an impact on the properties the economy exhibits.
Models of economies with interconnected firms have two aspects that are
different from standard markets. The structure of connections allows for the
pooling of the risk as the linkages guarantee a certain stability in supply and
demand of goods. Of course, as building linkages is costly, the number of con-
nections each firms has is limited and therefore the risk of losing supply is not
fully eliminated. On the other hand, connections allow for transmissions of bad
shocks in the economy. If a firm is hit by a bad shock affecting its production
then this can provoke a chain reaction where all the firms connected with the
given firm can suffer a lower or nonexisting supply. This has a direct negative
effect on their production or they can decide to replace the concerned connection
by a new one, which is costly.
The positive effect of risk pooling and chain reactions of negative shocks
on structures of interconnected firms are effects that we can not observe in
standard markets and that is why it is important to see what properties gives
the composition of these two effects compared to the standard market economy.
In the past economies with inter-firm relations have been discussed from
several angles in the economic literature. A model of buyer-seller networks has
been explored by Kranton and Minehart [13]. Their paper shows solid empirical
motivation for the existence of network structures in several industries. They
ask why these structures arise in real economies. And they answer by showing
that networks alow for the pooling of the risk. On the other hand they also show
that in a non-cooperative environment the networks that arise are not always
socially optimal.
The idea of financial interdependence has been explored by Kiyotaki and
Moore [7]. Their study explores the consequences of a small temporary shock
to the liquidity of firms that are part of a network interconnected by financial
obligations. They conclude that although on an individual level firms are able
to deal with this problem by rescheduling the debt, in aggregate it may lead
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to serious consequences such as a large and persistent fall of production. A
similar idea is explored by the same authors in Kiyotaki and Moore [6]. They
show that the dynamic interaction between credit limits and asset prices is a
strong transmission mechanism by which the shocks can persist, amplify and also
transmit to other sectors of the economy. Small temporary shocks to technology
or to income distribution can have a large effect, create fluctuations in asset
prices and in output of the economy.
The idea of firms interconnected in a network structure has been explored in
a paper by Kakade, Kearns, and Ortiz [10]. Their model is a general equilibrium
one on a fixed network. The network structure implies existence of local prices
that depend on interconnections in the network. The distribution of prices
across the network is an equilibrium result. An important fact to note is that
the network does not evolve over time, it is fixed and agents can not take any
decisions that would change the network’s structure.
In empirical literature the idea of interdependence in an industry has been
used by Elsinger, Lehar, and Summer [4]. They study vulnerability of the
Austrian banking system to a contagion of bankruptcies. Based on Austrian
data they identify the network of credit links in between Austrian banks and
they use a scenario analysis to test for a possible contagion. Their approach is
suitable for testing contagion effects on any type of static network but they do
not introduce any dynamics into the model.
This paper is a first step in modelling of firms’ connections in a dynamic
general equilibrium setting. The novelty of the model is in the endogenous
creation and destruction of supply linkages of firms. Linkages are modelled
explicitly for each firm but connections between firms are not explicit, they
pass through a market, to allow for market clearing as in standard general
equilibrium models.
A possible next step in this line of research is to add fixed costs of production
to the model in the spirit of the models of Hopenhayn[7] and Hopenhayn[8]. This
should allow us to observe endogenous exit of firms in the economy. Considering
one of the models of Hopenhayn as a benchmark we can then compare whether
the endogenous loss of linkages in the proposed model increases or decreases
the fraction of firms that decide to exit the economy. An increase in exits
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would mean that the linkages cause a spread of bad shocks in the economy. A
decrease on the other hand would mean that linkages ensure more stable supply
of intermediary good that would prevent from exits.
1.2 The Economy
Time in the economy is discrete and the horizon is infinite. The economy is
populated by intermediate production firms and final production firms, as well
as by a homogeneous mass of workers. Each of these three groups of agents is of
mass 1. Workers are employed by intermediaries who produce an intermediary
good. The intermediary good serves as an input in the production of the final
producers who produce a consumption good for workers. All the goods are non-
storable. Prices are established competitively and the economy is studied in a
stationary recursive competitive equilibrium.
The seller-buyer relationship between intermediaries and final producers is
different from the standard literature. For every unit of intermediary good sold
there must be a special supply linkage created between intermediaries and final
producers. Building linkages is costly but they persist over time.
In the model the supply linkages are not modelled explicitly, i.e. we do
not have supply linkages between a specific intermediary and a specific final
producer, but for every unit of intermediary good sold a given intermediary firm
must have supply linkages of the same size created, and similarly for the final
producers, for every unit of intermediary good bought a given final producer
must have supply linkages of the same size created. Therefore the linkages are
not directly connecting firm to firm but they are connecting firm to a market.
Building linkages represents communication of special requirements firms have
on the intermediary good. To transmit this requirement to the market is costly,
so there are set-up costs for linkages, but on the other hand, once the cost is
incurred linkages persist over time. Linkages can disappear in two ways, either
by a random shock or they disappear when they are not used. For every amount
of the intermediary good the supply can be done only through linkages of the
same size. When the amount of the supplied intermediary good is smaller than
the size of the linkages the redundant ones disappear. Linkages destroyed can
15
be rebuilt at the usual cost.
1.2.1 Workers
There is a unit mass of workers. They supply inelastically labor to intermediary
firms. At the same time they are the owners of the firms therefore their income
consists of the wages obtained for their work as well as profits of the firms.
The proceeds collected in the economy from the costs of link creation are also
divided among workers. The income of workers serves them to buy consumption
good. Workers have no decision to make, they simply spend all their income on
consumption.
1.2.2 Intermediary Firms
Intermediaries are of mass 1. They maximize discounted expected stream of
profits. They use labor n ∈ N = [0, 1] as the only input to their production.
The intermediaries are heterogeneous. Their production is subject to an id-
iosyncratic productivity shock z ∈ Z = [0,∞) that follows a first-order Markov
process, characterized by a transition matrix Q. The production function of
intermediaries is given by f(z, n) = z · nγ , where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the production
parameter. The result of the production is an intermediate good that serves
as input to the production of final producers. The intermediate good is in the
model considered to be a numeraire, therefore its price is normalized to 1. The
competitive wage paid to the labor force is denoted w.
The intermediate good can be sold to the final producers only through supply
linkages, denoted li. Creation of linkages is costly. The cost per unit is denoted
g. When the linkages are not used in the given period they automatically
disappear. This happens at no cost.
The decisions of an intermediary firm in one period is as follows. The firm
enters the period with linkages built in previous periods and it observes its
productivity shock, so the firm’s state is (z, li). Based on the state it decides
how much to produce knowing that for every unit of the intermediary good the
firm produces it needs to have or to build linkages to be able to sell the good.
For the linkages built the firm pays per-unit cost and the linkages persist to
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the next period. The decision on the size of the production is equivalent to
the decision on the size of the workforce employed, because the productivity
shock is already revealed. While deciding on the size of the production the
firm considers not only the size of the present productivity shock but, based on
the matrix characterizing the Markov process, also the expected future shocks.
Because building linkages is costly, even with a high shock in the present period
it is not profitable to invest in an extensive building of linkages if the expected
future shocks are low because the linkages will not be fully used in the next
period and therefore the unused capacity will disappear.
The decision of an intermediary characterized by the productivity shock
z and level of links li, and discounting future by a factor β ∈ (0, 1), can be
formalized in a recursive way as follows
vi(z, li) = max
n
{
z ·nγ − n·w − g ·max{0, z · nγ − li}+
β ·
∑
z′
vi(z′, li
′
)·Q(z′|z))
}
s.t. li
′
= z ·nγ ,
where Q(z′|z) is the conditional probability of the shock z′ in the next period,
given the present shock is z. This probability is given by the transition matrix
Q characterizing the Markov process for the productivity shocks.
As described already above, the linkages with which the firm will start next
period, li′, are the same as the linkages at the end of the present period, i.e. the
level is equal to the present production that was sold through the linkages.
1.2.3 Final Production Firms
There is a unit mass of final producers. They maximize discounted expected
stream of profits. They use intermediate good i ∈ I = [0,∞) as input to their
production. The production function of intermediaries is non-stochastic and it
is given by f(i) = iα, where α ∈ (0, 1) is the production parameter. The result
of the production is the consumption good. The price of the consumption good
is denoted p.
The intermediate good can be bought from the intermediaries only through
supply linkages, denoted lf . Similarly as for the intermediaries, also for the final
17
producers creation of linkages is costly. The cost per unit stays the same, g,
and linkages that are not used disappear at no cost.
Because linkages are the connection between intermediaries and final pro-
ducers the loss of linkages on one side of the market should be reflected on
the other side of the market. The loss of linkages of the final producers is the
implication of the individual fluctuations in the production of intermediaries.
Every individual final producer perceives such a loss of linkages as a shock. In
the model this shock is multiplicative. The fraction lf · (1 − s) represents the
linkages that are lost, while lf · s are the linkages that persist. The evolution of
shocks affecting linkages follows a Markov process.
The decisions of a final production firm in one period is as follows. The
firm enters the period with linkages built in previous periods and it observes
its shock to linkages. Based on these variables it decides how much to produce
knowing that for every unit of the intermediary good that should serve as an
input to its production it needs to have or to build linkages to be able to buy
the good. For the newly built linkages the firm pays per-unit cost. The linkages
at the end of the period, i.e. after purchase, will persist to the next period but
will again be subject to shocks.
The decision of the final producer entering the period with the linkages lf
and being subject to the shock s can be formalized in a recursive way as follows:
vf (lf , s) = max
i
{
p · iα − i− g ·max{0, i− lf ·s}+ β ·
∑
s′
vf (i, s′)·Π(s′|s)
}
,
where the linkages at the beginning of the next period are equal to the linkages
used to buy input in the present period, i.e. lf ′ = i.
1.3 Equilibrium
Because there is no aggregate uncertainty in the model we are able to study
the economy in a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium. For exposition
purposes it is convenient to consider a specific case of the general model, i.e.
to assume particular forms of distributions of shocks. We first start with the
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description of the equilibrium in the general case and afterward we discuss the
specific case of the general model.
1.3.1 General Case
In the general case we do not assume any specific form of the transition matrix
for the productivity shocks of the intermediaries and we assume that the shocks
to linkages of the final producers are idiosyncratic.
Therefore the problem of an intermediary is as follows
vi(z, li) = max
n
{
z ·nγ − n·w − g ·max{0, z ·nγ − li}+β ·
∑
z′
Q(z′|z)·vi(z′, z ·nγ)
}
.
The problem of final producers is as follows
vf (lf , s) = max
i
{
p · iα − i− g ·max{0, i− lf ·s}+ β ·
∑
s′
Π(s′|s)·vf (i, s′)
}
.
In this general case we can not directly solve the optimal closed-form policy
functions of intermediaries and final producers and to get results it’s necessary
to use simulations.
Let us denote the optimal policy function of intermediaries n(z, li). This
policy function describes the optimal labor force employed in the production
depending on the current productivity shock and existing linkages. Let us denote
i(lf , s) the optimal policy function of final producers. This policy describes the
optimal level of input used in the production of the final producers depending
on the existing linkages and shocks. The described policy functions directly
imply the policies for the linkages of both intermediaries and final producers.
li
′
(z, li) = z · (n(z, li))γ
lf
′
(lf , s) = i(lf , s)
On the aggregate level the shocks to linkages are determined in an endoge-
nous way. The shocks in the model serve as a transmission mechanism. When
intermediaries optimally decide to down-size their linkages this should have an
impact on the linkages of the final producers. There is no market mechanism
that would inform the final producers about the loss of linkages and therefore
they perceive this loss as a shock. Because the linkages are not modelled as a
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connection between two specific firms but rather they are the connection of firms
to a market, the distribution of shocks can not be determined by the model, it is
a modelling choice. On the other hand we know exactly what is the individual
as well as aggregate loss of linkages of the intermediaries, which is determined
endogenously, and this loss should hit the final producers. Therefore the ag-
gregate of the final producers’ linkages lost due to shocks is, in equilibrium,
equal to the aggregate of the linkages lost due to the down-sizing decisions of
intermediaries. The distribution and persistence of the shocks are exogenous.
Because the intermediaries as well as the final producers are heterogeneous
we should have a tool to describe this heterogeneity. Let us denote λi and λf
the distributions of intermediaries and final producers. The policy functions
determine the laws of motion for these distributions.
λi
′
(z′, li
′
) =
∑
(z,li):z·(n(z,li))γ=li′
Q(z′|z) · λi(z, li)
λf
′
(lf
′
, s′) =
∑
(lf ,s):i(lf ,s)=lf ′
Π(s′|s) · λf (lf , s)
The stationary recursive competitive equilibrium consists of the value func-
tions vi(z, li), vf (lf , s), policy functions n(z, li), i(lf , s), prices p, w, and prob-
ability measures λi, λf such that
1. given the prices p and w the policy functions solve the optimization prob-
lems of every intermediary and final producer,
2. the probability measures λi and λf are time invariant,
3. the aggregate of linkages of final producers lost in every period is deter-
mined endogenously and it is time invariant, i.e. the shocks s are drawn
from such a distribution that the following aggregate equality holds
∑
z
∑
li
max
{
0, li − li′(z, li)}·λi(z, li) =∑
lf
∑
s
(1− s) ·lf ·λf (lf , s),
4. the prices p and w are such that markets clear,
market for labor:
1 =
∑
z
∑
li
n(z, li) · λi(z, li),
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market for intermediary good:∑
z
∑
li
z · (n(z, li))γ · λi(z, li) =
∑
lf
∑
s
i(lf , s) · λf (lf , s),
market for final good:∑
lf
∑
s
(i(lf , s))α · λf (lf , s) = C,
5. aggregate variables, i.e. intermediate production I, final production F ,
and consumption C, are constant,
I =
∑
z
∑
li
z · (n(z, li))γ · λi(z, li)
F =
∑
lf
∑
s
(i(lf , s))α · λf (lf , s)
C = F,
6. aggregate feasibility holds,
C · p = w +Πi +Πf + CLi + CLf ,
where Πi and Πf are the profits of the intermediaries and the final pro-
ducers, and CLi and CLf are the costs of building linkages paid by the
intermediaries and final producers for which the following holds
Πi =
(∑
z
∑
li
z · (n(z, li))γ − n(z, li) · w −
g ·max
{
0, z ·(n(z, li))γ − li
})
· λi(z, li)
Πf =
(∑
lf
∑
s
p · (i(lf , s))α − i(lf , s)−
g ·max
{
0, i(lf , s)− lf ·s
})
· λf (lf , s)
CLi =
(∑
z
∑
li
g ·max
{
0, z ·(n(z, li))γ − li
})
· λi(z, li)
CLf =
(∑
lf
∑
s
g ·max
{
0, i(lf , s)− lf ·s
})
· λf (lf , s).
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1.3.2 Specific Example
To make the exposition of the equilibrium easy to follow we take several as-
sumptions that allow us to find an analytical solution of the equilibrium of the
model.
We assume that the productivity shocks of intermediaries can take only two
values, that we will call “high” and “low”. We consider a simple transition
matrix, we assume that all the conditional probabilities for the productivity
shock in the next period, given this period’s shock, are equal to 1/2.
With these simplifying assumptions the problem of every intermediary in
the steady state is the following
vi(z, li) = max
n
{
z ·nγ − n·w − g ·max{0, z ·nγ − li}+β ·
∑
z′
1
2
vi(z′, z ·nγ)
}
,
where z, z′ ∈ {zl, zh}.
For the final producers we assume homogeneity of shocks to linkages. The
probability of the shock is assumed to be one. Out of the steady state the firms
are uncertain about the size of the shock, which is determined endogenously as
a part of the equilibrium.
Since we assume homogeneity of firms with respect to the shock to linkages,
s, and because the size of this shock is endogenously determined in the model,
in a stationary recursive competitive equilibrium this value is not changing and
therefore s loses it’s properties of a state variable.
With these simplifying assumptions the problem of every final producer is
the following
vf (lf ) = max
i
{
p ·iα − i− g ·max{0, i− lf ·s}+ β · vf (i)
}
.
Since problems involving link-building as the one described above are not
standard in economic theory we will discuss the solution to firms’ problems in
detail to get some intuition about their optimal behavior.
Intermediary Firms
The intermediaries are subject to the productivity shocks. These shocks are
multiplicative constants in the optimization problems of the firms, therefore
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we can consider a general solution for a fixed z and only then see what is the
solution when there are two shocks1.
To find the solution we have to consider three possible cases, depending on
the relation between z · nγ and li0.
If z · nγ > li0, then the optimal size of intermediary production, i.e. also
the optimal size of linkages, is li
′
= z
1
1−γ
(
γ(1−g+ β2 g))
w
) γ
1−γ
. If z · nγ < li0, then
the optimal production is li
′
= z
1
1−γ
(
γ(1+ β2 g)
w
) γ
1−γ
. The third option is that
z · nγ = li0. For each of the two possible productivity shocks we get this type
of solution. For the sake of simplicity of the exposition in this specific example
we suppose that the size of the two shocks is such that the two policy functions
do not cross, i.e. ll < lh. This assumption guarantees a very simple steady
state distribution of firms. Graphically we represent the described policies in
the following way.
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The levels of l′ in the graphical representation are as follows
1This is possible only because we assume the transition matrix for shocks that guarantees
the same expected future for intermediaries independent of their present shock.
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ll = zl
1
1−γ ·
(
γ · (1− g + β2 g)
w
) γ
1−γ
ll = zl
1
1−γ ·
(
γ · (1 + β2 g)
w
) γ
1−γ
lh = zh
1
1−γ ·
(
γ · (1− g + β2 g)
w
) γ
1−γ
lh = zh
1
1−γ ·
(
γ · (1 + β2 g)
w
) γ
1−γ
.
The intuition for these results is simple. No matter what is the production
shock, we have two possible types of firms. Those that need to build up their
linkages and those that do not. Because the costs of production in these two
cases are different the solutions to their profit-maximizing dynamic problem are
different too. We obtain a small firm size z
1
1−γ
(
γ(1−g+ β2 g))
w
) γ
1−γ
, in the plot
denoted l, as a result of the problem of those firms that need to build up their
linkages. We obtain a large firm size z
1
1−γ
(
γ(1+ β2 g)
w
) γ
1−γ
, on the plot denoted
l, for those that are scaling down their linkages to the maximal size that is
still profitable. Due to the discontinuity of the costs between the firms that
are building up linkages and the firms that are scaling down we obtain a whole
region of firm’s size where they stay inactive, i.e. they take no action with
respect to their initial size of the linkages.
If the policies for the two productivity shocks were crossing it would im-
ply a continuum of types of intermediary firms in the steady state. On the
contrary, in our specific example with policies that do not cross we can show
that in the steady state of the economy there are only two stationary points
zl
1
1−γ
(
γ(1+ β2 g)
w
) γ
1−γ
and zh
1
1−γ
(
γ(1−g+ β2 g)
w
) γ
1−γ
.
It is clear that no matter what the initial conditions in the economy are,
after the first period the agents with the low productivity shock will have the
size of linkages belonging to the interval [ll, ll], and similarly, the agents with
the high shock the size belonging to the interval [lh, lh]. Because we consider
the economy in the steady state and because there is non-zero probability of
switch between the high and the low shock we know, that after such a switch
the agents will end-up either in ll or in lh. After that they continue only to
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switch between these two points when the shock changes. These two points are
therefore the only stationary points for the size of linkages.
The two steady state levels of linkages size correspond to two levels of labor
force used in the production. The two levels are as follows
nl =
(
γ · zl · (1 + β2 g)
w
) 1
1−γ
nh =
(
γ · zh · (1− g + β2 g)
w
) 1
1−γ
.
Although we have only two steady state levels of the labor force used by the
firms, and therefore only two levels of production, we have three levels of profits.
This is a consequence of the fact that the firms that have the high productivity
shock in the present period, depending on the shock they had in the previous
period, have or do not have to build additional linkages.
The intermediaries that face the low productivity shock never build any
linkages because they were either in the same situation in the previous period,
or they faced the high shock in the previous period and therefore they have
too many linkages built. Therefore these intermediaries make one-period profits
that can be expressed in the following way:
Πil = zl · nγl − nl · w.
On the other hand the profits of the intermediaries that face the high pro-
ductivity shock depend on their shock in the previous period.
The intermediaries that face two subsequent high shocks have no linkages to
build and their profits can be therefore expressed in the following way:
Πihh = zh · nγh − nh · w.
The intermediaries that face the high shock in the present period and had
the low shock in the previous period have to build some links and their profits
can be expressed in the following way:
Πihl = zh · nγh − nh · w − (zh · nγh − zl · nγl ) · g.
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Final Producers
Final producers are subject to loss of linkages caused by fluctuations in individ-
ual productions of intermediaries.
To make the exposition easy to follow, we first start by solving the final
producers’ problem for the limit case when s = 1 and then for the general case,
which is the case of our interest, s ∈ [0, 1).
When the shock s is equal to 1 this means that the linkages that were built
in the previous period are entirely preserved for the present period. To find the
solution we have to consider three possible cases. If i > lf , then the optimal size
of input, i.e. also the optimal size of linkages, is i = ( p·α1+g·(1−β) )
1
1−α . If i < lf ,
then the optimal i is i = (p · α) 11−α . The third option is that i = lf . This is a
similar type of solution as for the intermediary firms.
Now we consider the case when s ∈ [0, 1), i.e. in every period a fraction of
linkages disappears. Here too there are three cases to be considered. If i > lf ·s,
i.e. when the initial linkages need to be build up, similarly to the case when
s = 1, the optimal solution is i = ( p·α1+g·(1−β·s) )
1
1−α , denoted islow. This solution
corresponds to the region lf ∈ [a, b] in Figure 2. In the other two cases, because
the shocks to linkages play a role now, the intuition differs from the case when
s = 1. Now in every period a part of linkages disappears so if the firm stays
inactive in building its linkages, at some point in time its size will shrink under
the lower-bound size level established above and the firm will have to build-up
a part of its linkages. This is the case when initially i = lf ·s, which corresponds
to the region lf ∈ [b, e] in Figure 2. Because the linkages are shrinking at some
point lf ·s will fall below the lower bound threshold and the firm will have to
build up the linkages to get to the size islow. The last case to consider is the case
i < lf ·s, in Figure 2 in the region lf ∈ [e,∞), where the firm initially needs to
downsize its linkages. Here, intuitively, firm will not directly downsize to the
size islow. For several periods it will take advantage of the fact that a fraction
of linkages is disappearing in every period. For how many periods the firm will
let it’s linkages disappear without any up-scaling depends on the parameters
of the model and if we denote the number of such periods k then the optimal
solution to the firms size is i = (p·α·(1+β·s
α+(β·sα)2+)+...+(β·sα)k−1
1+β·s+(β·s)2+...+(β·s)k−1−g·(β·s)k )
1
1−α , in the
plot denoted ishigh.
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In this case, when s ∈ [0, 1), the only stationary point for the size of links is
the point islow.
The results are plotted in Figure 2.
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In the plot, as s ∈ [0, 1) increases and approaches to 1 the plot that corre-
sponds to the case s ∈ [0, 1) approaches to the one that corresponds to the case
s = 1. But only the case s = 1 implies a whole interval of stationary points
[ilow, ihigh].
In the steady state problem of final producers the loss of part of their linkages
in every period is a fixed and known fraction s ∈ [0, 1). The steady state solution
to the problem of the final producers is therefore as follows:
i =
(
α · p
1 + g · (1− β · s)
) 1
1−α
.
Now that we know what are the solutions to the firms’ problems we can
establish equilibrium prices and aggregate levels in the model.
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Definition of Equilibrium
Because the structure of the productivity shocks to intermediate production is
assumed to be very simple we know exactly what will be the distribution of
intermediary firms in the stationary state. We know that 1/2 firms have high
productivity shocks and 1/2 have low shocks. Therefore, the overall labor force
used by the intermediary firms is the following:
1
2
·
(
γ · zh · (1− g + β2 g)
w
) 1
1−γ
+
1
2
·
(
γ · zl · (1 + β2 g)
w
) 1
1−γ
.
At the same time we know that the workers supply the labor inelastically, and
therefore the labor force is equal to 1.
Having both sides of the equation for labor used in the economy we can
compute the price of labor
w = 2γ−1 · γ ·
((
zh · (1− g + β2 g)
) 1
1−γ
+
(
zl · (1 + β2 g)
) 1
1−γ
)1−γ
.
By similar reasoning we can establish the price of the final good p. We know
that the final producers will use in their production the following amount of the
intermediary good (
α · p
1 + g · (1− β · s)
) 1
1−α
.
At the same time we know that the intermediary goods used by the final produc-
ers in their production must be produced by the intermediaries. The production
of intermediaries is the following:
1
2
· zh · nγh +
1
2
· zh · nγl .
We know that in the steady state the good produced by intermediaries is
entirely used in the production of final producers. This equality allows us to
compute the price of the final good, p, having in mind that the price of the
intermediary good is normalized to 1.
p=
(
2γ−1· z
1
1−γ
h · (1− g + β2 g)
γ
1−γ + z
1
1−γ
l · (1 + β2 g)
γ
1−γ((
zh · (1− g + β2 g)
) 1
1−γ
+
(
zl · (1 + β2 g)
) 1
1−γ
)γ
)1−α
·1 + g · (1− β · s)
α
Now let us turn our attention to the shocks to linkages. The supply linkages
in the economy create a direct connection between intermediaries and final pro-
ducers. If on one side of this connection the intermediary firms optimally decide
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to down-size their production due to the low productivity shock, this should be
reflected on the other side and, in this model, this is done using the shock to
linkages.
More specifically, consider an intermediary that had in the previous period
high productivity but in the present period its productivity is low. Such in-
termediary will have to down-size its production. Because this is done at no
cost there is no mechanism in the economy that would transmit the information
about the down-sizing to the other side of the market, therefore the other side
perceives this downsizing as a shock.
Because we have assumed a specific structure of the productivity shocks we
know that in our economy, in every period, we have a mass of 1/2 of interme-
diaries that are hit by the low productivity shock and we also know that 1/2
of these had the high productivity shock in the previous period. Therefore we
have 1/4 of intermediaries that are downsizing their links in every period.
The aggregate of the linkages lost due to the down-sizing of the production
of some intermediaries is therefore the following:
1
4
·
(
zh · nγh − zl · nγl
)
.
We know that the aggregate of the linkages lost due to the shocks to linkages
of the final producers is:
(1− s) ·
(
α · p
1 + g · (1− β · s)
) 1
1−α
.
In the steady state the mass of linkages lost on one side of the market should
be equal to the mass lost on the other side which allows us to determine the
expression for the fraction of linkages persisting to another period
s = 1− z
1
1−γ
h · (1− g + β2 g)
γ
1−γ − z
1
1−γ
l · (1 + β2 g)
γ
1−γ
2 ·
(
z
1
1−γ
h · (1− g + β2 g)
γ
1−γ + z
1
1−γ
l · (1 + β2 g)
γ
1−γ
)
.
In the stationary recursive equilibrium the policy functions, value functions,
prices, and aggregate variables are stable. The policy function of intermediaries
determines the law of motion for their distribution2.
2Note that we have assumed that the transition probabilities are equal to 1
2
for all the
possible transitions between the shocks.
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λ(z′, li
′
) =
∑
(z,li):li′(z,li)=li′
1
2
· λ(z, li)
The stationary recursive competitive equilibrium of the described economy
consist of the value functions vi(z, li), vf (lf ), policy functions n(z, li), i(lf ),
prices p, w, and probability measure λ such that
1. given the prices p and w the policy functions solve the optimization prob-
lems of every intermediary and final producer,
2. the probability measure λ is time invariant,
3. the fraction of linkages of every final producer that persist in every period
is determined endogenously and it is time invariant,
s = 1− z
1
1−γ
h · (1− g + β2 g)
γ
1−γ − z
1
1−γ
l · (1 + β2 g)
γ
1−γ
2 ·
(
z
1
1−γ
h · (1− g + β2 g)
γ
1−γ + z
1
1−γ
l · (1 + β2 g)
γ
1−γ
)
,
4. the prices p and w are such that markets clear,
market for labor:
1 =
1
2
· nh + 12 · nl,
market for intermediary good:
1
2
· zh · nγh +
1
2
· zl · nγl =
(
α · p
1 + g · (1− β · s)
) 1
1−α
,
market for final good:(
α · p
1 + g · (1− β · s)
) α
1−α
= C,
5. aggregate variables, i.e. intermediate production I, final production F ,
and consumption C, are constant,
I = 2γ−1 · z
1
1−γ
h · (1− g + β2 g)
γ
1−γ + z
1
1−γ
l · (1 + β2 g)
γ
1−γ((
zh · (1− g + β2 g)
) 1
1−γ
+
(
zl · (1 + β2 g)
) 1
1−γ
)γ
F =
(
2γ−1 · z
1
1−γ
h · (1− g + β2 g)
γ
1−γ + z
1
1−γ
l · (1 + β2 g)
γ
1−γ((
zh · (1− g + β2 g)
) 1
1−γ
+
(
zl · (1 + β2 g)
) 1
1−γ
)γ
)α
C = F,
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6. aggregate feasibility holds
C · p = w + 1
4
·Πihh +
1
4
·Πihl +
1
2
·Πil +Πf + CLi + CLf ,
where CLi and CLf are the costs of link building paid by the intermedi-
aries and final producers.
1.4 Results
This chapter discusses in details the results for the specific model introduced
in the previous chapter. Because this link building model is a completely new
type of theoretical model of production, despite the fact that this paper has no
aspirations to calibrate the proposed model, it is still good to make sure that the
relative levels of aggregates and relative prices we obtain in the equilibrium are of
plausible magnitudes. The parameters of the model are fixed to standard values.
The discount factor β = 0.95, the parameter of the intermediary production,
in which the input is labor, γ = 2/3, the parameter of the final production
α = 1/3. The parameters specific for the proposed model we fix as follows:
productivity shocks are zh = 1 and zl = 0.5, the cost of link building g = 0.5,
the same as numeraire, which is the price of the intermediary good.
With these parameters fixed we obtain the following equilibrium results. The
fraction of linkages preserved to the next period s = 0.76, the wage w = 0.46
and the final good price p = 2.70, keeping in mind that the intermediary good
is numeraire in the model. For the aggregates, the labor is by assumption equal
to 1, the intermediary production I = 0.79 and the final production is 0.92.
This means that the model is sustainable in the long term, it does not collapse
and does not explode. Moreover, the results are not particularly sensitive to
changes in parameters, as can be seen in the table provided in the appendix.
1.4.1 Comparison with Benchmark Model
In this section we discuss what are the consequences of building linkages in the
proposed model by comparing it to a benchmark model. We do the comparison
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with the model without linkages. Important to note is the fact that in the
benchmark model, by construction, we do not have any intertemporal variable.
In the proposed model linkages are the only intertemporal element of the model.
For the benchmark model we assume the same characteristics as for the
link-building model. We assume homogeneous workers and homogeneous final
producers. We assume heterogeneous intermediaries characterized in the same
way as in the proposed model. The benchmark model, in mathematical terms,
corresponds to the limit case of the proposed model when the parameter g equals
to zero.
The results of the benchmark model are summarized in the following table.
benchmark model
nh ( zh·γw )
1
1−γ
nl ( zl·γw )
1
1−γ
w 2γ−1·γ·(z
1
1−γ
h
+z
1
1−γ
l
)1−γ
I (α · p) 11−α
p 2(γ−1)(1−α) · (z
1
1−γ
h + z
1
1−γ
l )
(1−γ)(1−α) · 1α
When we plug-in general equilibrium prices the optimal results, in terms of
numeraire, which is the intermediary good, are the following.
benchmark model
nh
2·z
1
1−γ
h
(z
1
1−γ
h
+z
1
1−γ
l
)1−γ
nl
2·z
1
1−γ
l
(z
1
1−γ
h
+z
1
1−γ
l
)1−γ
I 2γ−1 ·(z
1
1−γ
h + z
1
1−γ
l )
1−γ
Because the final production is always the same monotone function of the
input, iα, it is enough to compare the proposed model with the benchmark in
terms of the aggregate intermediary production I, for the final production the
same qualitative properties hold, it is only the magnitude that is different.
To compare the models in terms of the intermediary good produced we
consider the ratio of the productions in the two models IBI , where IB denotes
the intermediary production in the benchmark and I denotes the production
in the proposed model. After a straightforward simplification the ratio is the
following:
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IB
I
=
zh
1
1−γ + zl
1
1−γ
zh
1
1−γ (1− g + β2 g)
γ
1−γ + zl
1
1−γ (1 + β2 g)
γ
1−γ
·
((
zh(1− g + β2 g)
) 1
1−γ +
(
zl(1 + β2 g)
) 1
1−γ
zh
1
1−γ + zl
1
1−γ
)γ
.
This ratio helps us to determine in which of the two models the intermediary
production is higher. If the ratio is greater than one, then the benchmark pro-
duction is higher, if on the other hand it is lower than one, then building linkages
helps to increase the production over the level of the benchmark production.
To determine whether the ratio is greater than one it is enough to realize
that the benchmark model is a limit of the link-building model, when the cost
of link-building is equal to zero. Therefore, if the function I(g) is monotone we
will be able to compare the two intermediate productions. The derivative of the
intermediate production I with respect to the cost g is the following:
∂I
∂g
=
21+γ · γ ·
((
zh(1− g + β2 g)
) 1
1−γ +
(
zl(1 + β2 g)
) 1
1−γ
)−1−γ
· (zhzl) 11−γ(
4 + 4g(−1 + β) + g2β(−2 + β)) · (−1 + γ) ·(
(1− g + β
2
g)
γ
1−γ (1 +
β
2
g)
1
1−γ − (1 + β
2
g)
γ
1−γ (1− g + β
2
g)
1
1−γ
)
This derivative is negative for every possible combination of parameters, this
is due to the negative denominator in the fraction above. The negativity can
be seen once we realize that in order to have policy functions that do not cross
parameter g must satisfy the following inequality:
g <
1− (zl/zh)1/γ
1− β2
(
1− (zl/zh)1/γ
)
From the fact that ∂I/∂g < 0 we conclude that the intermediate production
is a decreasing function of the cost g for all the possible combinations of the
parameters of the model. Therefore we conclude that since the intermediate
production in the benchmark model is equal to I(g = 0) and the intermediate
production in the link-building model is equal to I(g > 0), the ratio IBI is greater
than one.
We have established that the intermediate production is lower in the link-
building model than in the benchmark model. That is an intuitive result becasue
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in the link-building model marginal costs are higher due to the building and re-
building of links after a bad shock.
Now let us focus on the composition effect between the firms with a low pro-
duction shock and the firms with a high production shock. In both benchmark
as well as in the link-building model we have the same equilibrium fractions of
firms with high and low shock, i.e. one half of the firms have a high shock and
one half have a low shock. Therefore it is not the composition but the size of
the two types of production that makes the difference between the models. We
want to know whether the benchmark production is higher because both the
firms with high productivity as well as the firms with low productivity produce
more or is it just one of the firms’ type that drives the result?
For the benchmark model the equilibrium intermediate productions of the
firms with high productivity shock and the firms with the low productivity shock
are the following:
(il)B =
2γ · zl 11−γ(
zh
1
1−γ + zl
1
1−γ
)γ
(ih)B =
2γ · zh 11−γ(
zh
1
1−γ + zl
1
1−γ
)γ
.
For the model with linkages the equilibrium intermediate production of the
firms with high productivity shock and the firms with the low productivity shock
are the following:
il = 2γ · zl 11−γ ·
(
(1 + β2 g)
1
1−γ(
zh(1− g + β2 g)
) 1
1−γ +
(
zl(1 + β2 g)
) 1
1−γ
)γ
ih = 2γ · zh 11−γ ·
(
(1− g + β2 g)
1
1−γ(
zh(1− g + β2 g)
) 1
1−γ +
(
zl(1 + β2 g)
) 1
1−γ
)γ
.
Using simple algebra we can establish that (il)B < il and (ih)B > ih. The
intuition for these two results is quite simple. The firms that are hit by the
low shock in the model with linkages do not want to destroy too many linkages
because destruction today implies costly reconstruction in the future, once hit
by a high productivity shock. Therefore the firms will try to save as many
linkages as possible because they bring them future value.
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On the other hand, once hit by the high productivity shock the firms in the
model with linkages may want to build up linkages, which is at additional per
unit cost g. This cost decreases their production with respect to the level of the
production in the benchmark model.
We can conclude that the second effect is predominant because in aggregate
the link building model exhibits lower level of intermediary production than the
benchmark model.
The analysis above illustrates negative effect of network structures. In the
economy where linkages are necessary for exchange the fall of production of
part of the intermediaries causes lost of linkages that translates into additional
costs for building new linkages and lower production. So the negative shock to
intermediaries’ production transmits as a lower and more costly production of
the final producers.
From the results established above we can see that the benchmark model
and the model with linkages exhibit different equilibrium levels of production.
It is important to see how much of this difference comes from the differences in
the technology assumed in the two models, i.e. building linkages, and what is
the effect of the general equilibrium, which implies different prices in the two
models.
We therefore consider the benchmark and the model with linkages out of
equilibrium, with the same level of wages, and we obtain the following result:
(IB
I
)
fixed wage
=
zh
1
1−γ + zl
1
1−γ
zh
1
1−γ (1− g + β2 g)
γ
1−γ + zl
1
1−γ (1 + β2 g)
γ
1−γ
.
Also with the fixed wages the level of intermediary production in the bench-
mark model is higher than in the link building model. This relative difference
is purely technological. On the other hand if we go back to the result already
established for the relative difference of intermediary productions taking into ac-
count respective general equilibrium prices we will see that the following holds:
(IB
I
)
GE wages
=
(IB
I
)
fixed wage
·
((
zh(1− g + β2 g)
) 1
1−γ +
(
zl(1 + β2 g)
) 1
1−γ
zh
1
1−γ + zl
1
1−γ
)γ
.
Therefore we can separate the effect of technology from the effect of the general
equilibrium. As a matter of fact, the effect of general equilibrium is, naturally,
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proportional to the difference in wages:
wB
w
=
(
zh
1
1−γ + zl
1
1−γ(
zh(1− g + β2 g)
) 1
1−γ +
(
zl(1 + β2 g)
) 1
1−γ
)1−γ
.
For the effect of the general equilibrium we conclude that the term belongs
to the interval (0, 1) and depends on all the parameters of the model. Intuitively,
the effect approaches one when the cost of link building g approaches zero.
Because the general equilibrium effect is smaller than 1 it is clear that the
general equilibrium prices help the model with linkages to approach the levels
of production of the benchmark model by diminishing the gap between the
productions under the fixed wages.
1.4.2 Comparative Statics of the Model with Linkages
Now let us discuss the comparative statics of the proposed model with linkages.
In the model there are two parameters that can have a major influence on
the behavior of the model: the cost of creation of linkages g and the relative
difference in productivity shocks, i.e. the ratio zl/zh.
We have already seen in the previous section that the intermediary pro-
duction is a monotone function of the cost g. As long as the ratio zl/zh is
considered, this represents the relative changes in productivity shocks, which
cause fluctuations in output of the intermediaries. It is interesting to see the
sensitivity of the output to a change in the ratio of shocks. We present the
results both for the benchmark model as well as for the model with linkages.
For the benchmark model we obtain the following derivative
∂IB
∂(zl/zh)
= 2γ−1 · zh · (zl/zh)
γ
1−γ
(
1 + (zl/zh)
1
1−γ
)−γ
.
Clearly, the derivative ∂IB∂(zl/zh) is always positive.
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For the model with linkages the derivative is the following
∂I
∂(zl/zh)
=
2γ−1 ·zh ·(zl/zh)
γ
1−γ
−1 + γ
(
(zl/zh)
1
1−γ (−1 + γ)(1 + β
2
g)
1+γ
1−γ −
(1 +
β
2
g)
γ
1−γ (1− g + β
2
g)
1
1−γ + γ(1− g + β
2
g)
γ
1−γ (1 +
β
2
g)
1
1−γ
)
(
(1− g + β
2
g)
1
1−γ + (zl/zh)
1
1−γ (1 +
β
2
g)
1
1−γ
)−1−γ
.
Due to the second part of the expression above, the derivative ∂I∂(zl/zh) can
be both negative as well as positive. That is an important result. It implies that
for a range of parameters an increase in the fluctuations, which is the decrease
of the ratio zl/zh, leads to an increasing additional intermediary production.
This can never be observed in the benchmark model where the derivative of the
intermediary production with respect to the ratio zl/zh is always positive. We
can see from the following plot that the derivative in the link building model
gets negative for a range of parameters where the cost of link building is high
and the ratio of production shocks is small3.
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This property is observed in the model with linkages and not in the bench-
mark as it is caused by the interaction between the technology parameter γ and
the cost of building linkages g, which is not present in the benchmark model.
More specifically, in the benchmark model, when fluctuations increase the pro-
duction of firms with low shock goes down, the production of firms with high
3The plot area is restricted to such g and zl/zh that the policy functions for high and low
productivity shock do not cross and the prices are computable.
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shock goes up and while the overall effect is positive, the marginal effect is
always negative, i.e. the additional production is decreasing with increase in
fluctuations. On the other hand, in the model with linkages, the marginal effect
can be both positive as well as negative, i.e. the additional production can be
both increasing and decreasing with increase in fluctuations. It is because of
the composition of the production of firms with high and low shocks?
In the model with linkages the role of firms with high shock is diminished, as
the shock is always multiplied by the factor 1−g+ β2 g < 1, while the role of firms
with low shock is amplified because of multiplication by the factor 1 + β2 g > 1.
These multipliers cause the difference in the composition of the overall effect in
the benchmark model and model with linkages.
From this result we can conclude that in an environment where fluctuations
in production of big magnitude are present and costly building of linkages is
necessary for supply of goods, these linkages are an arrangement that helps to
boost intermediate production when an increase in fluctuations occurs. This
is a clear positive effect that the economy with linkages has compared to the
anonymous market economy.
1.5 Conclusions and Possible Extensions
This paper presents a new type of general equilibrium model in which we model
supply linkages between firms that are often present in real economies. It is
shown that this type of model has properties different from a standard produc-
tion model. The model exhibits both positive as well as negative properties we
expect network structures to have. The aggregate production in the proposed
model is lower than in the benchmark economy. That is a direct consequence
of transmission of bad shocks in the economy through linkages that imply re-
building of linkages, which increases the marginal cost of production. On the
other hand the proposed model has better behavior than the benchmark with
respect to fluctuations in production. In case of increase in fluctuations the
links help to boost aggregate production, which is always marginally decreasing
in the benchmark model.
The model should be further explored in a more general setting without
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any restricting assumptions on shocks, with continuum of types of firms and a
convex cost function for building linkages. Such a model has a more complicated
distribution of firms that can have a significant influence on the aggregates of
the economy. The generalized model is not tractable analytically and therefore
requires simulation of all the results.
It would be also interesting to explore the model with more than two shocks.
In the presence of several, or continuum of, shocks the economy with linkages
should exhibit a certain degree of stability. While in the benchmark model
the output is expanded or shrunken as an immediate response to a shock, in
the model with linkages this structure of the economy creates disincentives to
diminish output once the links are created and also, if the links are not created,
their cost is a disincentive for expansion4.
Another possible extension of the suggested model is to model the supply
structure explicitly and therefore assume a certain network structure of the
economy and possibly allow this structure to dynamically change.
The model can be also enriched in terms of entry and exit of firms. It can
help to explore whether the persistent supply relationships in the economy help
to avoid exits or they, due to a possible chain reaction, help to propagate bad
shocks causing increasing number of exits from the economy.
4These effects are present also in this paper and are visible on the comparison of outputs
of firms with low and high shock in the benchmark model and the presented model, but the
stability should become more obvious in the model with continuum of shock where firms when
hit only by a slightly different shock than in the previous period should be reluctant to change
the level of production.
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1.A Appendix
1.A.1 Sensitivity of the Model w.r.t. Parameters
The following Table summarizes several possible parameterizations of the pro-
posed model with linkages. In the upper part of the table parameters of the
model are fixed. The lower part then present prices and aggregates computed
for the given fixed parameters. The presented parameterizations of the model
differ only in one parameter at a time, the parameter is highlighted in bold font.
As in the model, also in the table the aggregate labor is assumed to be equal
to 1 and the price of the intermediary good is also equal to 1.
β 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.99
α 1/3 2/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3 1/3
γ 2/3 2/3 2/3 2/3 2/3 2/3 2/3
zh 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
zl 0.5 0.5 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.5
g 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.1 0.5
s 0.7603 0.7603 0.9711 0.7953 0.6869 0.6325 0.7582
w 0.4555 0.4555 0.6300 0.5692 0.4879 0.5281 0.4607
p 2.7046 1.3487 2.5479 2.5188 2.6521 2.5078 2.6720
I 0.7875 0.7875 0.9502 0.8738 0.8146 0.8245 0.7884
F 0.9234 0.8527 0.9831 0.9560 0.9339 0.9377 0.9238
As we can concluded from the table, the model is not particularly sensitive
to changes in parameters, and relative prices as well as relative size of aggregates
are of reasonable magnitude.
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Chapter 2
Stable Matchings in an
Economy with Strong and
Weak Agents
2.1 Introduction
This paper describes the properties of the stationary equilibrium of a particu-
lar matching market. Agents in the economy meet at random and they have
possibility to create a match. It is assumed that agents are heterogenous in
their probabilities of leaving the economy, which effectively means destruction
of their match. Probabilities of exit influence lifetime of matches and therefore
profit the matches bring to the agents.
The stationary situation of the economy with exit and entry of agents is
studied. Optimal individual decisions of accepting or rejecting each particu-
lar type of match are analyzed and the social optimality of these decisions is
assessed.
In economic literature the models where markets are modelled as a place
for social contacts between individuals are referred to as search models. Search
models have been used to study the properties of labor markets, money markets
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and also so called marriage markets. The basic model of reference in the labor
market literature is Mortensen and Pissarides [10]. They developed a model
of two-sided matching between vacant jobs and unemployed workers that was
able to explain reasonably well the job creation and job destruction observed
in the United States. Mortensen-Pissarides aggregate matching function was
afterwards widely used in macroeconomic models of job search. Since then the
research moved towards empirically more appealing models that allow on-the-
job search. From this literature the model of matching between employers and
workers by Kiyotaki and Lagos [6] is close in its spirit to the model presented in
this paper. The matching model of Kiyotaki and Lagos helps to explain several
features of labor market like the size and persistence of changes in income of
workers due to job-to-job transitions, the length of job tenures and unemploy-
ment duration.
The matching models have been used also in the money market literature
in order to explain why fiat currency can function as medium of exchange. For
reference see Kiyotaki and Wright [7], [8].
The marriage market literature has its origins in the paper of Gale and
Shapley [5]. They study the equilibrium properties of a particular two-sided
matching market, the marriage market. They assume that every man has pref-
erences over women and every woman has preferences over men and they study
properties of the set of stable matchings in the economy. The “marriage” model
was then extended in many ways, especially by assuming different degrees of
transferability of the utility within pairs (e.g. Burdett and Wright [3]).
An interesting two-sided matching model is proposed also by Burdett and
Coles [1]. They assume that the agents are ex-ante heterogenous, each is charac-
terized by a real number which is in fact the utility of the spouse after they agree
to marry. In this setting the authors are able to observe an equilibrium sorting
of agents into clusters based on the numbers by which they are characterized.
Burdett and Coles focus their attention only on the process of match creation,
i.e. once a match is created the agents leave the market and are replaced by
new agents.
The model presented in this paper also focuses on the process of match
creation. Agents are assumed to be of two ex-ante types - strong agents and
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weak agents. The types differ by their exogenous probabilities of leaving the
market. Since, by assumption, the matched agents do not have an opportunity
to meet other agents, the matches split only due to exogenous reasons, i.e. when
one of the partners exits the economy. The strength of the agents has therefore
a direct impact on the expected lifetime of a match.
Matching enables interaction of agents, which is modelled like a production
process. Proceeds from the production are split between the members of the
pair. Single agents can not produce but they have prospects of being matched
in the future. Optimal behavior of agents imply that a match is created only
when both partners find it profitable, taking into account the outside option
of staying single. Once the match is created, the matched agents do not have
any incentives to walk away because their outside options do not change over
time. Agents’ optimal decisions of creating or rejecting a match are studied in
an environment where agents differ only in their probabilities of exit from the
economy but not in their productivity.
Possible extension of the proposed model are to assume that agents can
search while matched or to allow for interaction of more than two agents. These
extensions may allow the model to be suitable as the model of search on the
labor market.
2.2 The Model
Time in the economy is discrete and the horizon is infinite. The economy is
populated by agents of unit mass. There are two observable types of agents
- strong ones and weak ones. We will refer to these characteristics as ex-ante
types of agents. The mass of the strong agents is A and the mass of the weak
agents is 1−A. The strength of agents is measured by their probability of exit
from the economy. Let w denotes the probability of exit of a weak agent in a
given period and s the probability of exit of a strong agent in a given period
(w > s).
The interaction between agents, modelled like a production process, is hap-
pening in pairs. By assumption a pair of agents produces 2 · pi units of goods
which they split. The pair bargains over splitting the proceeds from production.
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Agents in the economy can be not only matched but also single. Those that
are matched produce every period until one member of the pair exits. The other
member is left single and the exiting one is replaced by a single agent of the
same type, i.e. of the same strength as the exited one. Note that since no new
information is revealed over time, we are focusing on the stationary situation of
the economy, and the agents can not search for a new partner while matched,
the agents do not have any incentives to walk away from the match once it was
formed, i.e. the exits in the economy are only exogenous.
Single agents enter a market of singles. On this market in every period a
fractionm of the singles is randomly proposed matching into pairs. This fraction
is fixed, it is not dependent in any way on the searching behavior of individual
agents in the economy.
The matching offer can come only once per period. Agents individually
choose whether to accept the proposed match or stay single for another period. If
both agents accept the match is created. Agents’ individual decisions determine
the types of possible equilibria. The conditions under which agents accept the
proposed matches are discussed. The analysis is performed with respect to 4
parameters: the fraction of strong agents in the population A, the probability
of being matched when single m, the probability of exit of the weak agents
from the economy w, and the probability of exit of the strong agents from the
economy s.
There can be up to 6 types of agents in each population. Three types of
strong agents: a strong one matched with another strong, denoted ss type; a
strong one matched with a weak one, sw type; and a non-matched strong, so
type; and similarly three types of weak agents: ws type, ww type, and wo type.
We will refer to these characteristics as ex-post types of agents.
2.2.1 The Bargaining Procedure
When two agents meet and have a possibility to create a match, they enter
a bargaining procedure. The bargaining takes into account that the outside
option of agents is to stay single for another period. When the two agents are
of a different strength their values of being single differ. Therefore if they create
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a match the split of the proceeds from their production will be uneven.
As was already stated, the one-period production of a pair is independent of
the composition of the pair. Pairs differ only in their expected lifetime, which
depends on the composition of the particular pair. Therefore the pairs differ in
their expected future profits.
Agents do not have any decisive power over the production, the only decision
agents face is whether to match with a proposed partner when the matching
situation occurs. Intuitively it is in the interest of both sides to match because
only the pair interaction brings profits to agents. But due to bargaining it can
happen that not every proposed match is accepted. The basic trade-off of the
model is between the expected profit extracted from the particular match and
the expected lifetime of the match1. Based on this trade-off agents may be
willing to reject a certain type of the proposed match. As an example, consider
the case when the probability of matching in each period is relatively high (m
is high), the fraction of weak agents in the economy is high (A is small), and
the difference between the strength of weak and strong agents is big (w − s
is big). Then when two strong agents meet they may consider rejecting the
proposed match because they know that in the next period they have a high
probability to be matched with weak agents and because of the big difference
between the strengths they will be able to extract a lot of profit from the weak
agents through the bargaining procedure.
The bargaining is assumed to be a take-it-or-leave-it offer. When two single
agents meet one of them is randomly chosen to suggest the split of the ex-
pected proceeds from the future production of the pair (each of the agents is
chosen with probability 12 ). This agent will offer to his counterpart the smallest
share possible so that the counterpart still accepts the offer, i.e. the profit the
counterpart would have today when taking an outside option of staying single.
The value of the outside option is the discounted value of being single (of the
corresponding type) in the next period (it is discounted by the time factor β
but also by the probability that the agent survives till the next period). But
this value sums up all the future profits of the particular type of agent. The
1Either the agents can gain high one-period profits but the pair has a short life expectancy,
or they have lower one-period profits with high life expectancy.
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proposing agent will offer only the part of this value that corresponds to the
present period2.
This means that, for example, in the case of the match of a strong and a
weak agent when the strong agent is proposing the split, the outside value of his
weak counterpart is β(1−w)vwo, where vwo denotes the value of being wo type
at the beginning of every period. The value is the sum of all expected future
profits of a weak single agent that come from the possible matches in the future.
The exact formula for the value will be stated later on.
The outside option differs from the value vwo because the agent was in the
present period already proposed a match and if he rejects it his profit in the
present period is 0 and the value comes only from the future prospects given
the agent will survive till the next period. The present’s part of the outside
value is (1 − β(1 − w))β(1 − w)vwo3. The strong agent therefore has to offer
(1 − β(1 − w))β(1 − w)vwo to the weak one and he will take 2pi − (1 − β(1 −
w))β(1−w)vwo. This happens with probability 1/2. With the same probability
he will get (1−β(1− s))β(1− s)vso when the weak agent is proposing the split,
and the weak one will take 2pi − (1− β(1− s))β(1− s)vso.
Note that when the agents of the same type meet they both have the same
bargaining power and therefore they must split the proceeds of the production
equally, i.e. both agents get exactly pi. Also note that the split of profits, as
described above, is in fact a Nash bargaining result.
The bargaining procedure makes agents indifferent between accepting a pro-
posed match and taking the outside option. When computing agents values
of being a certain type the possibilities that the agent is proposing the split
and the agent is accepting the split are taken into account. Since this expected
profit from the bargaining can be either greater or smaller than the outside op-
tion for some parameters, agents will reject the proposed match and for other
parameters they will accept it.
2One-period profit as a flow variable while the value of agents is the corresponding stock
variable.
3(1− β(1−w))β(1−w)vwo(1+ β(1−w) + (β(1−w))2 + (β(1−w))3 + ...) = β(1−w)vwo
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2.2.2 Values and Distributions
Because no searching while matched is allowed the agents have no incentives to
walk away from a match once they have accepted it. Moreover, every period a
particular type of agent faces the same prospects. Consequently, we can express
the value of being a certain type recursively. The values for the six types, under
the assumption that each agent would accept the proposed match, are:
vss = pi + β
(
(1− s)2 · vss + (1− s)s · vso
)
vsw = 1/2
(
2pi − (1− β(1− w))β(1− w) · vwo + (1− β(1− s))β(1− s) · vso
)
+
β
(
(1− s)(1− w) · vsw + (1− s)w · vso
)
vso = m ·
(
S · vss +W · vsw
)
+ (1−m)β(1− s) · vso
vww = pi + β
(
(1− w)2 · vww + (1− w)w · vwo
)
vws = 1/2
(
2pi − (1− β(1− s))β(1− s) · vso + (1− β(1− w))β(1− w) · vwo
)
+
β
(
(1− w)(1− s) · vws + (1− w)s · vwo
)
vwo = m ·
(
S · vws +W · vww
)
+ (1−m)β(1− w) · vwo
where we assume that the value of exit is 0, β is a factor by which agents
discount the future.
Under the assumption that the Law of Large Numbers holds, in a matching
situation agents will face a weak or a strong counterpart with probabilities that
are proportional to the fractions of weak and strong agents that are single. The
probabilities, and also the fractions of weak and strong agents in the pool of
single agents, are denoted W and S respectively.
The probability S is equal to
S = dso/(dso + dwo)
and the probability W is equal to
W = dwo/(dso + dwo) = 1− S
where d.. are distribution fractions of agents of indicated types.
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The system of value functions can be rewritten in a matrix form as
V · v = pi
where v′ = (vss, vsw, vso, vws, vww, vwo), pi′ = (−pi,−pi, 0,−pi,−pi, 0) and V
is the matrix implied by the system of equations. The matrix equation can be
analytically solved and we get the value functions dependent only on parameters
of the model.
v = V−1 · pi
The distribution of agents across types distr = (dss, dsw, dso, dws, dww, dwo)
evolves in time according to the vector equation
distrt+1 = distrt ·Q.
Q is a transition matrix that describes movement of agents across the states.
We are looking for a stationary distribution distr∗, i.e. distribution that is
stable in time
distr∗ = distr∗ ·Q
Since agents are ex-ante of two strengths we will look for two stationary dis-
tributions, one for each type. Note that the fraction of ws type in the stationary
distribution of weak agents must be the same as the fraction of sw type in the
stationary distribution of strong agents.
Under the assumptions that the Law of Large Numbers holds and every
agent accepts the proposed matching the transition matrices for strong and
weak agents are QS and QW . The interpretation is that an element qij is the
probability that the next period the agent will be of type j given that today he
is of type i.
QS =

(1− s)2 0 (1− s)s+ s
0 (1− s)(1− w) (1− s)w + s
mS(1− s)2 mW (1− s)(1− w) (1−m)+mS((1−s)s+s)
+mW ((1−s)w+s)

QW =

(1− w)2 0 (1− w)w + w
0 (1− s)(1− w) (1− w)s+ w
mW (1− w)2 mS(1− w)(1− s) (1−m)+mS((1−w)s+w)
+mW ((1−w)w+w)

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The types are ordered ss, sw, so in QS matrix and ww, ws, wo in QW
matrix.
When computing the stationary distributions of weak and strong agents we
have to take into account that dss+dsw+dso = A, and dww+dws+dwo = 1−A
must hold.
It is important to note that S and W are functions of the stationary distri-
bution, therefore the system of equations describing the stationary distribution
is not linear.
2.2.3 Stable Equilibria
This section in detail describes what is understood, in the context of this model,
to be a stable equilibrium, and how different types of equilibria occur.
A set of agents’ matching strategies together with corresponding values form
the stable equilibrium if they constitute a Nash equilibrium and the strategies
are evolutionary stable4. This means that none of the agents has incentives to
change his strategy, given the strategy of the other agents. At the same time
the strategies are resistent to small invasions, i.e. if there exists a fraction ε
of agents that have decided to deviate in their strategy the agents playing the
equilibrium strategy do not find it profitable to join the group of deviants.
In the context of the model there are up to six types of agents in the station-
ary situation of the economy. Fewer types can occur in the stable equilibrium
depending on the strategies of agents. For all the possible strategies we have to
check whether they constitute a Nash equilibrium and then check whether they
are evolutionary stable. It is easy to see that, for example, some trivial Nash
equilibria will not be stable from the evolutionary point of view.
The agents of both weak and strong type have 4 possible strategies5:
1. reject every match proposed
4Only pure strategies are discussed in this paper.
5Agents of the same ex-ante type use the same strategy.
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2. accept only the match with an agent of the same ex-ante type
3. accept only the match with an agent of the opposite ex-ante type
4. accept all the proposed matches
These strategies can lead to several types of matchings. Each of the matchings
can be characterized by the types of agents that exist in the matching. When
respecting the assumptions of the model, the candidates for equilibria are6:
1. the matching consisting of types so, and wo
2. the matching consisting of types ww, so, and wo
3. the matching consisting of types sw, ws, so, and wo
4. the matching consisting of types sw, ws, ww, so, and wo
5. the matching consisting of types ss, so, and wo
6. the matching consisting of types ss, ww, so, and wo
7. the matching consisting of types ss, sw, ws, so, and wo
8. the matching consisting of types ss, sw, ws, ww, so, and wo
There are no other possibilities that can occur. If the assumptions of the model
are respected the single agents must always be present, and if the type sw exists
so must the type ws.
Graphically we can represent the matchings as follows:
6Further on we will refer to the matchings based on the number assigned to them here.
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The system of equations for the values of the types that has been described
in the previous section applies to the matching 8. The rest of the matchings
are less complex. They can be described by systems of equations similar to the
one that applies for matching 8. The systems of equations are simpler because
some of the nonexisting types are not present and the values of these types of
agents can be considered to be zero. Similarly, the transition matrices have to
be adjusted to the fact that some of the types of agents do not exist in matchings
1− 7.
We consider the stationary situations of the above described matchings, i.e.
the situation when the values of the types of agents as well as the distribution
are stationary. A stationary matching is considered to be a stable equilibrium if
it is a Nash equilibrium with strategies that are evolutionary stable. It is easy to
see that from the eight candidates for stable equilibrium matchings matchings
1, 2, and 5, i.e. the matchings that leave the whole populations of weak and/or
strong agents single, are not evolutionary stable. Take as an example matching
2, where all the strong agents are single. Assume there exists a small group of
strong agents that decide to deviate in their strategy and match with a strong
agent if they meet one that is willing to match with them. Then the strategy of
not accepting any match proposed is evolutionary unstable, because it assigns
agents the value of 0, while the strategy of accepting a match with another
strong agent has a positive value implied by the fact that the match, unlike
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single agents, is productive7.
2.2.4 Multiple Stable Equilibria, Pareto Dominance
The theoretical matching model described in the previous sections has 4 param-
eters: m, A, w and s. The goal is to describe how the existence of different
stable equilibria depend on the parameters of the model. Naturally, for a given
combination of the parameters, several stable equilibria can occur, i.e. param-
eters are such, that several combinations of weak and strong agents’ strategies
lead to Nash equilibria that are also evolutionary stable. In this situation the
question of Pareto dominance of one equilibrium over another one occurs. It
is important to notice that the stationary equilibria are never directly compa-
rable because they never consist of the same types of agents. Therefore it is
not enough to compare the value of a certain type of agents in one equilibrium
with the value of the same type of agents in the other equilibrium. A Pareto
dominating equilibrium, in the context of this model, is such that all the values
of a fixed ex-ante type of agent in this equilibrium are higher that the values of
the same ex-ante type in another equilibrium. The condition, though it seems
rather strict, is necessary because the ex-post types of agents as well as their
distribution in the two equilibria are different and therefore one type of agent
in the first equilibrium can become a different type in the other equilibrium8.
2.2.5 Social Optimality
The proposed model allows for the study of social optimality of the equilibria
implied by the agents’ optimal decisions. Assume that in the model there exists
a social planner who’s goal is to maximize the aggregate welfare of the economy.
Assume the social planner has no means how to change the meeting technology
in the economy but he can influence agents’ decisions by imposing rules on which
7The value of match with another strong agent reflects the fact that the match produces
every period until the exit of one of the matched agents, as well as the fact that the probability
of meeting an agent who is deviating is m · S · ε, where ε is the fraction of deviants in the
population of single strong agents S.
8Note that it is enough to do the comparison of the values for the strong and the weak
agents separately as the ex-ante types of agents can not change over time.
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match they have to accept and which match they have to reject. The only way
of dissolution of a match is exit of one of the matched agents from the economy.
The stability of matchings is therefore imposed on the agents. This implies that
the matchings that would be unstable from the point of view of agents can be
chosen as optimal by the social planner.
The task of the social planner is simple. For each combination of parameters
of the model and for each of the matchings 1 - 8 described in section 2.2.3 he
computes the stationary distribution and the values of the types of agents.
Using these the planner determines aggregate welfare Ω, which is defined as a
weighted average of the values of types of agents with the weights that are the
corresponding fractions of the distribution of agents.
Ω = dss · vss + dsw · vsw + dso · vso + dww · vww + dws · vws + dwo · vwo
The agents’ decisions are then, for the given combination of parameters,
considered to be socially optimal if the set of equilibria stable under the given
combination of parameters contains the stationary matching preferred by the
planner.
In cases where the social optimum differs from the optima chosen by agents
the natural question one can ask is whether the planner’s solution is Pareto
improving for the agents.
By the same argument as in the previous section, the matchings are directly
incomparable between each other because in every comparison at least one type
of agents is missing or is redundant. Moreover, the distribution of agents in
each of these matchings is completely different so it is not clear whether the
agent of a certain type in one matching will be of the same type in the other
matching. The only possibility how to make sure that one matching is Pareto
improving when compared with another matching is to make sure that all the
values of types of agents in one matching are higher than all the values in the
other matching.
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2.3 Results
The stationary distributions as well as the values of types of agents in each of
the 8 matchings mentioned in section 2.2.3 can be analytically expressed as the
functions of parameters of the model. The values are homogenous of degree 1
in pi.
To solve for the stationary state, first the stationary distribution has to be
obtained. By a simple fixed point argument the stationary distribution exists
and is unique9 for every well defined transition matrix, which is the case of the
transition matrices described in the theoretical section of the paper. Details of
computation of the distribution can be found in Appendix 2.A.1.
After the stationary distribution is obtained the results enter the computa-
tion of the values of types of agents. The analytical solution to the system of
value functions can be obtained but due to their complexity the analysis that
follows is based on the results of a computation of the values for each particular
combination of the parameters of the model. In the computation the profit pi
is fixed and is equal to 1. Since the values are homogenous of degree 1 in pi
this choice of the numeric value of pi is not restrictive. The discount factor is
β = 0.95, which is a standard value. The computation is performed for different
fixed values of A, m, s, and w between zero and one, more precisely for eleven
cases: for every 0.1 point in the interval (0, 1) and for the extreme cases 0.001
and 0.99910
2.3.1 Results of Agents’ Optimal Decisions:
Agents strategies may lead to 8 possible types of matching. For each of the 8
cases we have to check whether the strategies lead to a Nash equilibrium and if
yes then whether they are evolutionary stable.
When agents follow any of the strategies except for the strategy “accept all
the proposed matches” the resulting matching will consist of single agents of
9The theoretical background discussed in detail can be found in Stokey, Lucas, and
Prescott [12].
10Values 0 and 1 for probabilities pose problems in computation of distribution of agents.
Since the model assumes that w > s all the computations take that into account.
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both ex-ante types and at most one type of match for each of the ex-ante types,
i.e. the resulting matching can be 1, 2, 3, 5, or 6, as described in the section
2.2.3. In these matchings the value of being matched is necessarily higher than
the value of being single. The reasoning behind this fact is simple. Matches
are productive, single agents are not. Because for each ex-ante type there does
not exist more than one type of match, the strategic waiting for a better match
can not be profitable. Therefore the value of being matched consists of today’s
profit from production plus the prospects of being matched (in the same type of
match) or being single. The single agents have zero profits in all the subsequent
periods until they become matched, therefore their value is smaller than the
value of the matched agents.
In the cases of matchings 1, 2, and 5 where the whole populations of strong
and/or weak agents are single their values are necessarily equal to 0 because
they are not producing and they have no prospects of being able to produce in
the future.
From the considerations above it follows that for each of the matchings 1,
2, 3, 5, or 6, the values of the matched agents are higher than the values of the
single agents of the same ex-ante type. Therefore the strategies leading to each
of these matchings, the invariant distributions and the values of the agents in
these matching, constitute Nash equilibria. Another straightforward conclusion
is that matchings 1, 2, and 5 are not evolutionary stable. For each of these if
there exists a small group of agents that decide to accept the match with their
own type, they will make profit by playing this deviating strategy11. Therefore
the candidates for stable matchings for each combination of parameters are
matchings 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8. For each of these the evolutionary stability of the
corresponding strategies has to be checked.
If either the population of weak and/or the population of strong agents
plays the strategy of accepting all the matches proposed the strategic rejection
of certain type of match becomes an issue. Therefore, for some combinations
of parameters the matchings resulting from this strategy may not be a Nash
equilibrium. For example, strong agents may find it profitable to reject the
11Value of deviating is positive. The reasoning behind this fact has been discussed at the
end of section 2.2.3
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match with a weak agent in a situation where the population of strong agents
is big and meetings are common, because they have good prospects of quickly
meeting a strong agent with whom they will produce for many more periods,
in the expected terms. Another strategic consideration, when the population
of weak agents is big, may be to wait for a weak agent from whom the strong
agents can extract a lot of profits through the bargaining procedure.
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The results of computations of stable equilibria with all the combinations of
values of the 4 parameters of the model are summarized in Appendix 3.A.1 in
Table 2.3.
To get the intuition behind the results we will focus our attention to one limit
case of the model. We consider that strong agents do not die, i.e. the probability
s is equal to 0. Even with this limit assumption we are able to obtain all the
interesting combinations of stable equilibria that the general model implies.
Moreover, when the probability of meeting a new partner m is low the
matches in the economy are very valuable, therefore the only equilibrium strat-
egy is to accept all the matches proposed, leading to the equilibrium matching
8, which is therefore for a majority of combinations of the parameters the only
matching that forms stable equilibrium. For the higher probability of being
matched multiple stable equilibria occur. It is due to the fact that both match-
ing 3 and matching 6 are Nash equilibria. If the agents do not have incentives
to deviate from these two towards the same equilibrium, then necessarily we
obtain multiple equilibria. We will therefore focus our attention on the cases
when meeting are common, i.e. m is relatively high.
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As we have already concluded, matchings 3 and 6 are always two coexisting
Nash equilibria and they may be excluded from the results only in the cases
when the strategies leading to this equilibria are not stable. The computations
show, that each of the matchings 3, 4, 6, 7 and 8 can be a stable equilibrium for
certain range of parameters. Matching 3 therefore creates multiple equilibrium
with matching 6 and in some cases with matching 8. Matching 4 always coexists
with matching 6. This happens for the range of parameters where matching 4 is
Nash equilibrium. Agents will always deviate from matching 3 towards matching
4. Matching 6 can coexist either with matching 7 or matchings 7 and 4 at the
same time.
When the probability of meeting m is very high, matchings 3 and 6 form
stable equilibria basically for the whole range of probability w. In this range
matchings 4, 7 and often also matching 8 do not form Nash equilibria and
therefore matchings 3 and 6 are necessarily stable. When the probability of
meeting decreases, matching 4 becomes Nash equilibrium, especially for higher
values of probability w. Weak agents will deviate in their strategy from matching
only with strong agents towards the strategy of accepting every match proposed
and therefore matching 3 will not be stable anymore and will be replaced by
matching 4. The reasoning behind this is as follows. When the probability w
increases, keeping other parameters fixed, value vws goes down due to decreased
life expectancy of the couple. This has an impact on the value of being single
vwo, which also goes down and therefore value vww can easily become greater
than vwo, which makes matching 4 a Nash equilibrium. Once 4 is Nash the
agents will always deviate from 3 towards 4.
The threshold for the probability w at which agents deviate from matching
3 towards matching 4 moves closer to one as the fraction of strong agents in the
economy A gets larger. It is because the probability of meeting a weak agent
goes down, which decreases the value of ww pairs and therefore matching 4 is
Nash equilibrium only for higher values of w.
When the probability of meeting a new partner m decreases towards values
m = 0.6 − 0.7, then for probability w close to one not only matchings 4 and 6
are stable equilibria. Matching 7 joins them in the multiple equilibrium. The
high probability w decreases the value of strong agents in mixed pairs vsw, that
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as a consequence decreases the value of singles vso and the value of pairs of
strong agents can therefore easily become greater than the value of being single.
At the same time pairs of weak agents are not particularly attractive, because
the high probability w and relatively low probability of meeting m imply very
low value of pairs ww, in fact lower than the value of staying single, which
makes matching 7 form a stable equilibrium. At the same time the probability
of meeting is still high enough so that weak agents can reject certain matches.
With a further decrease of probability of matching agents have to accept all the
matches proposed and this implies matching 8.
When 7 is stable equilibrium agents always have incentives to deviate from
3 towards 7. Other types of deviations are not very common. That is why
we can observe coexistence of matching 7 either with matching 6, or with both
matching 4 and matching 6.
One more type of coexisting stable equilibria occurs. It is matching 3 with
matching 8. This happens for high fractions of strong agents in the economy
A and low probabilities w. The usual starting point is matchings 3 and 6
that are Nash. Matching 3 is stable because for the low values of w and low
probability to meet a weak agent, there are no incentives to create weak pairs,
therefore matching 4 is not Nash. On the other hand, given this parametrization,
matching 8 also forms Nash equilibrium and agents will always deviate from
matching 6 towards matching 8. This is an implication of the fact that strong
agents may improve their value by exploiting the bargaining procedure is the
sw pair and weak agents improve lifetime of their pair in the ws match. On
the other hand matching 3 is stable with respect to matching 8 as pairs ww are
not present in matching 3 and they are not an improvement for weak agents in
matching 3.
Despite the fact that this analysis of equilibria is provided for a fixed value
of probability of exit of strong agents, similar results can be obtained without
this restrictive assumption. The analysis without any restrictions has been
performed and summary of the equilibria together with their characteristic range
of parameters can be found in Appendix 2.A.2 in Table 2.3. Illustrative plots of
the equilibria showing the change of equilibria with the change of parameters is
provided in Appendix 2.A.3.
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Among the coexisting equilibria two types of Pareto dominance occur but
they are present only for small ranges of parameters. Matching 4 dominates
matching 6, typically for small values of the parameter A, and matching 8
dominates matching 3, typically for the values of A in the middle range.
2.3.2 Results of Planner’s Optimal Decisions:
In the planner’s problem, when studying which are socially optimal matchings,
matchings 3, 4, 7, and 8 can be socially optimal depending on the combination
of parameters. It is important to realize that for a matching to be socially
optimal several factors play a role. The welfare of the economy depends on
both the stationary distribution and the values of types. So, if in the stationary
distribution fraction of one type of agents is high and at the same time the value
of this type is relatively high this can be crucial for the matching to be socially
optimal.
For the planner the split of profits within a pair does not play any role
because the social value of every pair is the same since every pair produces 2pi
per period. The planner is therefore concerned only about the expected lifetime
of every type of producing pair. This is precisely the reason why matching 6
can not be optimal for the planner’s problem. In matching 6 the mixed pairs
are not present. The pairs are only of the ss-type or of the ww-type. This is
inefficient from the planner’s point of view because the planner would prefer to
take advantage from the longer expected lifetime of the strong agents and by
matching them with weak agents improve the lifetime of the weak agents’ pairs.
So the planner will first use the strong agents for the mixed pairs and only in
the situation when there are many strong agents he will allow for the “luxury”
of ss-type of pairs. Therefore, if ss-type is present in the matchings imposed
by the planner so must be the mixed types. That is why matching 6 is never
socially optimal.
The ranges of parameters under which the 4 above listed types of matching
are socially optimal are summarized in Table 2.4 in the Appendix. Briefly the
ranges of the parameters can be characterized as follows.
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The matching 3 is socially optimal typically when meetings are common
(m ≥ 0.7), strong agents are in a minority in the economy (A ≤ 0.5) and strong
agents are very strong (s very low). Under this parametrization the planner
uses strong agents for increasing the lifetime of matches of the weak agents, i.e.
strong agents are matched with weak agents in mixed pairs. Because the strong
agents are very strong and the probability of meeting is high the planner will
forbid ww-type of matches, he will prefer to let the weak agents wait for a strong
partner that will dramatically prolong the expected lifetime of the couple.
For the similar range of parameters as in the previous case, with the differ-
ence that there is even less strong agents in the economy (A ≤ 0.3), the planner
will allow also for ww-type of matches, implying matching 4. Because there are
too few strong agents in the economy to meet a strong counterpart is difficult.
Therefore more profitable than to wait for a strong agent is to allow weak agents
to create short lasting ww-type couples.
Matching 7 is socially optimal when there are many strong agents in the
economy, i.e. when A is large (A ≥ 0.5). Because there are many strong agents
in the economy the planner wants to use them to improve the expected lifetime
of pairs where weak agents are present, i.e. the planner will allow for the mixed
pairs. And as the strong agents are in the majority the planner can also allow
for creation of ss-type of pairs. On the other hand he will forbid ww-type of
pairs in the cases when the meetings are common (m is high). Under such
parametrization the planner prefers to let the weak agents wait for a strong
counterpart rather then to let them create short-lasting ww pairs. In expected
terms, the waiting time for a strong counterpart should be short as meetings
are common and strong agents are in majority in the economy.
Matching 8 is typically socially optimal in the cases when the strong agents
are not too special, i.e. they are either not too strong (s is relatively high) or
they are almost the same as the weak agents (w − s is small). In these cases
the planner has no reason to forbid any type of match. Matching 8 is also
characteristic for the parameterizations with m small, i.e. when meetings of
single agents are rare. Under these circumstances the planner can not afford to
forbid any type of match as the expected waiting time for another match is too
long.
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The equilibria implied by agents’ decisions are now to be compared with the
socially optimal matchings. For each combination of the parameters it should be
assessed whether the stable equilibria chosen by the agents contain the socially
optimal matching. If that is not the case then the agents’ decisions lead to a
socially suboptimal matching. The reason why agents’ decisions may lead to
the socially suboptimal result is simple. Agents by taking optimal individual
decisions end up in the stable equilibrium. The planner, on the other hand,
can implement a matching that is not evolutionary stable or not even a Nash
equilibrium. That means he can, for example, force agents to create matching
where the value of being single is higher than one of the values of being matched.
Of course, the agents would choose to reject such type of match and they would
prefer to stay single. That would lead to a lower fraction of matched agents
which could have in the end a negative impact on the overall welfare of the
economy.
Computations suggest that about 18% of agents’ choices under all possible
parameterizations are not socially optimal. The types of socially suboptimal
choices the agents make are briefly summarized in Table 2.1. The table shows
all possible types of suboptimal choices that have been obtained in the numeric
computations. The most common socially suboptimal choices of the agents are
the multiple equilibrium of matchings 3 and 6, and the multiple equilibrium
of matchings 4 and 6. In both cases the planner’s choice is typically matching
8, though for small ranges of parameters it can be also other matchings, as
summarized in Table 2.1.
In some of the cases of agents’ socially suboptimal decisions the planner can
achieve a Pareto improvement by implementing the matching optimal from his
point of view. The Pareto improvement, as already described in the previous
section, is achieved when all the values of types in the improving matching are
higher than the values in the matching chosen by the agents. In this way im-
provement is guaranteed for all the agents as the distribution of agents changes
with changing the type of matching. Note that there are two types of Pareto
improvement that can be considered. First type is the one where the Pareto
improving matching is improvement of all the stable matchings for the given set
of parameters. The other, a weaker version, is such that the socially optimal
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Socially suboptimal equilibria
Agents’ choice Planner’s choice
3
8 4
7
7 8
3
4,6 8
3,8 7
4
3,6 7
8
6,7 8
4,6,7 8
Table 2.1: Socially suboptimal choices of agents
matching is Pareto improving at least one of the stable matchings chosen by the
agents.
The Pareto improvement by the social planner can be achieved rarely, in
approximately 14% of the cases when agents do not behave socially optimally.
In most of the cases the improving matching is matching 8, in minority of the
cases it is matching 7. The Pareto improvement is typically achievable for high
values of the parameter m, and it is briefly summarized in Table 2.2.
Pareto improvement by planner
Agents’ choice Planner’s choice
6 7
6 8
3 8
Table 2.2: Pareto improving matchings
The planner can also achieve the improvement of all the matchings that are
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stable from the agents’ point of view. For a small range of parameters under
which the coexistence of matchings 6 and 3 occurs the planner can achieve a
Pareto improving situation by imposing matching 8.
2.4 Conclusions
The paper studies the stationary situation of the matching market in the econ-
omy where agents differ in their probabilities of exit. In this economy the
agents’ optimal profit maximizing decisions can lead to several types of stable
equilibrium matching. The model produces 5 different types of stable equilib-
ria. Multiple equilibria are possible for certain ranges of parameters. Overall
we observe 7 types of multiple or simple stable equilibria.
The optimal behavior of the agents can be summarized as follows. For the
lower probabilities of meeting a potential partner agents tend to accept every
proposed match. For the higher probabilities of meeting the profit extractions
from the bargaining procedure play a significant role and therefore some of the
proposed matches are rejected. The agents’ optimal decision leads, particularly
for higher probabilities of being matched, to socially suboptimal matchings.
Socially optimal can be 4 of the 5 matchings resulting from the agents’ decisions.
This is an implication of the fact that the social planner does not care about
the division of the profits within pairs.
In approximately 18% of the cases the social planner is able to improve
welfare of the economy by imposing matchings, usually with more types of
matched agents, that are unstable from the point of view of agents. Some of
the planner’s decisions lead to the Pareto improvement for all the agents in the
economy.
The results of this paper suggest that the presence of the social planner in
the organization of matching markets may be beneficial for the overall welfare
of the economy and may have also a Pareto improving effect for all the agents
in the economy.
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2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Results for the Stationary Distribution
The following results for the stationary distribution hold for the case when all
the matches are accepted, i.e. for matching 8.
When solving for the distribution, the system of six equations together with
two constraints, dss + dsw + dso = A and dww + dws + dwo = 1 − A, can be
narrowed down to the system of two quadratic equations with two unknowns
that has two sets of solution. It can be shown that only one of these will give
positive results for all combinations of parameters s, w, m, A. The system of
quadratic equations is:
d 2so(1−m+
m
2s− s2 ) + dsodwo(1−m+
m
s+ w − sw )−Adso −Adwo = 0
d 2wo(1−m+
m
2w − w2 )+dsodwo(1−m+
m
s+ w − sw )−(1−A)dso−(1−A)dwo = 0.
Then the solution of the system that is plausible, i.e. that gives positive
fractions of dso and dwo, is:
dso =
−xy + y2 − 2Ay2 + 2Axz + (x− y)√(1− 2A)2y2 − 4(−1 +A)Axz
2x(−y2 + xz)
dwo = −y
2 − 2Ay2 − 2xz + 2Axz + yz + (y − z)√(1− 2A)2y2 − 4(−1 +A)Axz
2z(−y2 + xz)
where x, y, z stand for
x = 1−m+ m
2s− s2
y = 1−m+ m
s+ w − sw
z = 1−m+ m
2w − w2.
The other four fractions of the stationary distribution can be expressed,
using dso and dwo, like this:
dss = m · d
2
so
dso + dwo
· (1− s)
2
2s− s2
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dsw = dws = m · dsodwo
dso + dwo
· (1− s)(1− w)
s+ w − sw
dww = m · d
2
wo
dso + dwo
· (1− w)
2
2w − w2
In a similar manner the results for all other types of matching, i.e. matchings
3, 4, 6, and 7 can be obtained. As a matter of fact, the same system of quadratic
equations can be used for the computation, only the expressions for x, y, and
z will change. One or two of them will be equal to 1, depending on which
matching we consider.
2.A.2 Summary of the Equilibria
Table 2.3 summarizes the coexisting equilibria implied by agents’ decision and
provides rough intervals for the parameters under which the equilibria occur.
The intervals of parameters are only the estimates done based on the plots done
for 121 combinations of values of the parameters A and m and plotted for the
approximation of a continuous range of the parameters w and s, where w ≥ s.
As stated and explained in section 3.3.1, for each combination of the pa-
rameters one of the matchings 8 and 6 is always stable equilibrium. For the
combinations of parameters where m ≤ 0.7 it is the matching 8, for the extreme
value of m being close to 1 it is matching 6. In between these values the di-
vision of the space of parameters s and w is approximately described by the
line s = max(0.05 + 2.5(m − 0.6) − 0.5Aw, 0). For the values of s higher than
this threshold matching 8 is the stable equilibrium, for the lower values it is
matching 6. Matchings 3, 4 and 7 then can be ordered on the plots from the
left to the right,i.e. matching 3 occurs for the lower values of w, matching 4 for
the middle range and matching 7 for high values of w.
It is important to note that the table summarizing the coexistence of the
equilibria has only an informative character and the inequalities described by the
table do not hold for some exceptional cases of the combination of parameters.
Also, because equilibrium matching 8 forms the stable matching for the majority
of the combinations of parameters it is not described in detail. On the contrary,
all the other cases are described in a great detail and it is implied that the rest
of the combinations of parameters describes matching 8 in case when it is the
only stable equilibrium matching.
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Coexisting Values of the parameters
equilibria A m w, s (s≤w)
7 0.999 0.999 w≥0.6, s≤0.3w-0.03, s≥0.125w+0.075
6, 7 0 - 0.1 0.7 - 0.8 w≥ m+0.1
s∈[0.4·(m-0.7)+0.1-A,0.4·(m-0.7)+0.3-2·A]
4, 6, 7 0.1 - 0.9 0.7 - 0.9 w≥ m+0.1-0.2·A
s∈[0.1+(m-0.7)·3-0.4·A,0.2+(m-0.7)·3-0.4·A]
4, 6 0.001 - 0.5 0.6 - 0.9 w∈[0.1,0,3], s→0 for m=0.6
w≤0.8+A, s≤0.25·w·(1-A) for m=0.7
∀w, s∈[(0.5-A)·w, (0.6-A)·w] for m=0.8
∀w, s∈[0.8·w-A·0.5·w,0.85·w-A·0.5·w] for m=0.9
0.5 - 0.9 0.7 - 0.9 w≥A-0.4, s→0 for m=0.7
w≥A-0.3, s≤0.35·w-(A-0.5)·0.5
s≤0.4-0.35·m-((A-0.5)·0.5)·(1-w) for m=0.8
w≥A-0.2, s≤(1.15-A)·w, s≤1.05-A for m=0.9
3, 6 0.001 - 0.5 0.8 - 0.999 ∀w, s≤(0.6-A)·w for m=0.8
∀w, s≤(0.9-A)·w for m=0.9
∀w, ∀s for m=0.999
0.5 - 0.999 0.7 - 0.999 w∈[0.05, A-0.4], s→0 for m=0.7
w∈[0, A-0.3], s≤(0.9-A)·w for m=0.8
w∈[0, 0.55+(A-0.6)·0.5], s≤(1.15-A)·w for m=0.9
∀w, ∀s for m=0.999
3, 8 0.3 - 0.4 0.6 - 0.9 w∈[0,(m-0.5)·0.5], s .=w
0.6 - 0.999 0.3 - 0.9 w∈[0, 0.5·(A-0.5)+0.4·(m-0.3)], s→0 for m≤0.7
w∈[0, 0.5·(A-0.5)+0.4·(m-0.3)]
s≥((0.9-A)+(m-0.8)·2.5)·w for m≥0.8
8 ∀A 0.001 - 0.9 all the ranges not covered by the previous cases
Table 2.3: Agents’ optimal choice
Table 2.4 summarizes socially optimal matchings and typical parameters for
which they occur. Similarly to the case of agents’ optimal decisions, the in-
tervals of parameters are the estimates done based on the plots done for 121
combinations of values of the parameters A and m and plotted for the approxi-
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mation of a continuous range of the parameters w and s, where w ≥ s. Socially
optimal can be matchings 3, 4, 7, and 8.
Social Values of the parameters
optima A m w, s (s≤w)
3 0.2 0.8-0.999 w∈[0.35-0.5(m-0.8), 0.45+(m-0.8)], s→0
0.3 0.7-0.999 w∈[0.1+6s, 0.3+1.5(m-0.7)-9s], s≤0.1(m-0.6)
0.4 0.5-0.999 w∈(4s, 0.08+0.8(m-0.5)-3s]
s≤0.1(m-0.6) for m≥0.7, s→0 otherwise
0.5 0.999 w∈[0.02, 0.1], s→0
4 0.001 0.7-0.999 ∀w, s≤w[0.5(m-0.7)+0.05]
0.1 0.7 w∈[0.05, 0.45], s→0
0.8-0.999 ∀w, s≤0.5w(m-0.7)
0.2 0.8 w∈[0.1, 0.35], s→0
0.9-0.999 ∀w≥0.05, s≤0.05+w(m-0.9)
except w∈[0.25, 0.55+(m-0.9)], s→0
0.3 0.999 w∈[0.8, 0.95], s→0
7 0.5 0.999 w∈[0.1, 0.25], s≤0.02
0.6 0.8-0.999 w∈[0.05,0.2+0.7(m-0.8)-s], s≤0.01+0.2(m-0.8)
0.7 0.7 w∈[0.05,0.2], s=0.02
0.8-0.999 w∈[0,0.06+0.2(m-0.8)] & s→0
w∈[5s-0.1,0.5m-2.5s+0.05], s∈(0,0.04+0.1(m-0.8)]
0.8 0.6-0.999 w∈[0,0.04+0.4(m-0.6)] & s→0
w∈[2.5s,0.5m-2.5(s-0.02)], s∈(0,0.15m-0.07]
0.9 0.4-0.999 w∈[0,0.4m-0.1] & s→0
0.6-0.999 w∈[0.05+2.5(s-0.02),0.5m+0.1-2.5(s-0.02)]
s∈(0,0.15m-0.07]
0.999 0.4-0.999 w∈[0,m-0.2] & s→0
0.5-0.999 w∈[0.05+2.5(s-0.02),m-5s],s∈(0,0.16m-0.06]
8 0.001 - 0.999 ∀m ranges not covered by the cases 3, 4, and 7
Table 2.4: Planner’s optimal choice
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2.A.3 Plots of Equilibria
This section contains illustrative plots of equilibria implied by individual deci-
sions as well as the social planner’s equilibria. The plots are done for the case
discussed in the paper, i.e. s = 0. The value of parameter A is fixed and the
particular value is stated on each of the plots. The whole range of parameter w
is covered together with higher range of parameter m. The plots show on pur-
pose higher values of parameter m where we can observe many different types
of equilibria with changing values of the parameters w and A.
For each possible combination of parameters the type of equilibrium is com-
puted and then it is plotted in the color reserved for that particular type of
equilibria. The table preceding the plots should help orientation among differ-
ent types of equilibria in both agents’ and planner’s problems.
On the horizontal axis we have parameter w, the vertical axis represents
parameter m.
Different types of equilibria are distinguished by different colors as follows:
Agents’ choice Planner’s choice 
7 
6, 7 
4, 6, 7 
4, 6 
3, 6 
3, 8 
8 
3 
4 
7 
8 
70
Equilibria of agents’ problem:
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
A =0.1
w
m
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
A =0.5
w
m
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
A =0.9
w
m
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Equilibria of planner’s problem:
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
A =0.1
w
m
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
A =0.3
w
m
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0.6
0.65
0.7
0.75
0.8
0.85
0.9
0.95
1
A =0.7
w
m
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Chapter 3
Stable Firm-Worker
Matchings in an Economy
with Ageing Workers
3.1 Introduction
This paper is inspired by the research that has been done on equilibrium proper-
ties of two-sided matching markets. Traditionally, the labor market or marriage
market are studied. These markets are considered to be two-sided because
matches are created between agents from two distinct disjoint populations.
Good examples of such populations are firms and workers, men and women.
The match is defined as a long-term relationship of two agents, each coming
from a different population. It is assumed that being in a match is a profitable
activity, and agents maximize their expected future profits. The economy is
studied in a stationary situation when the matching between the two popula-
tions is stable, i.e. no matched individual prefers to be single, and no single
individual, when having an opportunity to match, would choose the match over
the option of staying single.
This paper focuses on a labor market matching. The firms are assumed to
be identical, workers on the other hand are of two types. The types do not
75
differ in their productivity but they differ in their probabilities of leaving the
economy. Workers’ probabilities of exit influence the lifetime of matches and
therefore profit from the matches. The proposed model allows for the study of
equilibrium properties of a simple labor market with entry and exit of agents.
Optimal individual decisions of accepting or rejecting each particular type of
match as well as firing decisions of firms are analyzed and social optimality of
these decisions is assessed.
In the past two-sided matching models have been used to address questions
related to labor markets and marriage markets. The two sided matching mod-
els have been widely used to study both macro and microeconomic problems.
Mortensen and Pissarides [10] developed a model of two-sided matching be-
tween vacant jobs and unemployed workers. The model was able to explain
reasonably well job creation and job destruction observed in the United States.
Mortensen-Pissarides aggregate matching function has since then been widely
used in macroeconomic models of job search.
A model of matching between employers and workers by Kiyotaki and La-
gos [6] helped to explain several features of the labor market like the size and
persistence of changes in income of workers due to job-to-job transitions, the
length of job tenures and unemployment duration.
In micro-oriented literature, the discussion on two-sided matchings started
with the “marriage” model of Gale and Shapley [5]. They assumed that every
man has preferences over women and every woman has preferences over men
and they studied properties of the set of stable matchings in the economy. The
marriage model was then extended in many ways, especially by assuming dif-
ferent degrees of transferability of the utility within pairs (e.g. Burdett and
Wright [3]).
An interesting two-sided matching model was proposed by Burdett and
Coles [1]. They assumed that the agents are ex-ante heterogenous, each is
characterized by a real number which is in fact the utility of the spouse after
they agree to marry. In this setting the authors were able to observe an equi-
librium sorting of agents into clusters based on the numbers by which they are
characterized. Burdett and Coles focused their attention only on the process of
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match creation, i.e. once a match is created the agents leave the market and
are replaced by new agents.
The following model focuses on the process of match creation but allows also
endogenous dissolution of matches. Firms are homogenous in the model. The
workers are heterogenous. They do not differ in their productivity but they
do differ in their probabilities of leaving the workforce. Workers can be young
or old, with the assumption that young with a certain probability become old.
The type of the worker has therefore impact on the expected lifetime of the
worker-firm match.
Matching enables production. Proceeds from the production are split be-
tween the members of the match. Non-matched agents can not produce but
they have prospects of being matched in the future. Optimal behavior of agents
imply that a match is created only when both partners find it profitable, tak-
ing into account the outside option of staying single. Firms, depending on the
parameters of the model, may have incentives to fire their worker when he be-
comes old. Optimal decisions of creating, rejecting and dissolution of a match
are studied and they are compared to the optimal decision of social planner.
3.2 The Model
Time in this economy is discrete and the horizon is infinite. The economy
consists of a mass 1 of firms and a mass 1 of workers. Every firm needs to
employ one worker in order to be able to produce. The proceeds from the
production are split between the firm and the worker.
The characteristics of the agents are as follows. The firms are ex-ante iden-
tical. They are characterized by their probability of bankruptcy, denoted b.
Bankrupted firms are replaced by new firms, characterized by the same proba-
bility of bankruptcy, so that the mass of firms in the economy is kept constant.
The workers are ex-ante of two types - workers with lower probability of exit
from the economy, we will call them young workers, and workers with higher
probability of exit, we will call them old workers. The types do not differ in their
productivity. The young workers are also characterized by their probability of
becoming old. Naturally, the old workers can not become young, they can only
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exit. The workers that exit the economy are replaced by young workers so that
the mass of workers in the economy stays constant.
In mathematical terms, we will assume a simple structure “without mem-
ory”, i.e. probability that a young worker exits labor force is y and that is true
in every period. Probability that he stays in the labor force is 1− y. This case
is further divided into two possibilities. The worker either ages, becomes old,
which happens with probability (1− y)a, or the agent stays young for another
period, which happens with probability (1− y)(1− a). Probability that an old
worker exits the labor force is denoted o, (o > y). Consequently, probability
that an old worker stays in the economy for another period is 1− o.
Workers and firms are matched to pairs at random. Probability of meeting
a partner for match is m and it is the same for the workers and the firms. When
firm meets a worker it chooses whether to accept the worker for the match, in
which case the pair starts to produce, or reject the match and search for a worker
for another period1. Only non-matched firms and workers can be matched, i.e.
there is no “on-the-job” search. The firms can decide to fire the workers that
aged, i.e. became old in the given period2. The dissolutions of pairs happen
also due to exits of firms and workers from the economy. The surviving part of
a dissolved pair becomes again a searching worker or firm and waits for a new
match.
The timing in one period of the economy is as follows. First, the state of the
world is revealed. Bankrupted firms and workers that are out of the labor force
leave the economy and they are replaced by new firms and young workers. Firms,
if they decided to do so, fire the old workers and start to look for young ones. The
firms whose workers exited join the pool of searching firms, the workers whose
firms went bankrupt join the pool of searching workers. A fractionm of the pool
of searching firms at random meets a fraction m of searching workers. In every
1The agents will always accept the match with a firm because being in the match, unlike
being single, brings profit, and because all the firms are the same, i.e. there are no strategic
reasons why not to accept the proposed match. The young agents have no incentives to wait
because their contract will automatically change once they age, as ageing is observable by
firms
2Firms can have incentives for dissolution of their match only when the characteristics of
the worker they employ changes. In other cases they would not create the match at all rather
than split afterwards.
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pair the firm decides whether to match and produce with the proposed worker
or whether to search for another period. Every firm-worker pair produces 2pi of
good in every period and these proceeds from production are divided between
the firm and the worker based on the Nash bargaining solution, taking into
account that the outside option for both the firm and the worker is to stay
single and search for another production partner.
In a stationary situation of the economy there are up to three types of firms
and 4 types of workers. The firm can be either matched with a young worker,
or with an old worker or it can be searching. Both young and old workers can
be either matched with a firm of they can be searching. Consequently, we can
have 7 possible types of agents in a stationary equilibrium. Denote fy the firm
that is matched with a young worker, fo the firm that is matched with an old
worker, and fs the firm that is searching for a worker. Similarly, denote yf the
young worker that is matched with a firm, and ys the searching young worker.
The notation of will be further on used for the old worker matched with a firm,
and os will stand for the old searching worker.
3.2.1 The Bargaining Procedure
When a worker and a firm meet they enter a bargaining procedure. The bar-
gaining takes into account that the outside option of both is to stay single for
another period. Since the values of non-matched firms and non-matched work-
ers differ when a firm-worker match is created they split the proceeds of the
production unevenly.
As was already stated, the one-period production of a pair is independent of
the type of worker. Pairs differ only in their expected lifetime, which depends
on the composition of the particular pair. Therefore the pairs differ in their
expected future profits.
Firms do not have any decisive power over the production, the only decision
they face is whether to match with a proposed worker when the matching situ-
ation occurs. Intuitively it is in the interest of both sides to match because only
the pair interaction brings agents profits. But due to bargaining it can happen
that not every proposed match is accepted. The basic trade-off of the model is
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between the expected profit from bargaining and the expected lifetime of the
match. In pairs where firms have much lower probability of exit than workers
the firms gain a lot through bargaining but the expected lifetime of matches is
small, on the other hand if workers have low probability of exit, firms do not
gain much in bargaining but lifetime of matches is long. Based on this trade-off
firms may decide to reject a certain type of worker they meet. For example, in
the situation when the meetings are common (the probability m is high) and
the old workers leave the workforce often (the probability o is high), if the firms
are characterized by a low probability of bankruptcy (b is low) then they have
a lot of bargaining power over the old workers and they extract a lot of profits
from the production. In such a situation the firms may decide to reject matches
with the young workers that would take part of the profits due to their stronger
bargaining position. It is simply more profitable to be matched with old work-
ers whose turnover is higher but because of the high probability of meeting a
new worker when non-matched the firms can be sure to be producing in almost
every period and extracting profits from the bargaining over the production.
Therefore this is the case when the extracting of profits from the old agents
more than offsets the effect of the longer expected lifetime of matches with the
young workers.
The bargaining is assumed to be a take-it-or-leave-it offer. When a firm
meets a worker one of them is randomly chosen to suggest the split of the
expected proceeds from the future production of the pair (each of the agents is
chosen with probability 12 ). This agent will offer to his counterpart the smallest
share possible so that the counterpart still accepts the offer, i.e. the profit
the counterpart would have today when taking an outside option of staying
single. The values of the outside options are the discounted values of being
non-matched (of the corresponding agent) in the next period (discounted by
the time factor β but also by the probability that the agent survives till the
next period). But these values sum all the future profits of the particular type
of agent. That is why only present parts of these values are taken into account.
The outside options differ from the values of being non-matched because the
agents are proposed in each period at most one match. If they reject the profit
in the present period is 0 and the value of a particular agent comes only from
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the future prospects given the agent will survive till the next period. Note that
the split of profits, as described above, is in fact the Nash bargaining result.
3.2.2 Values and Distributions
As already discussed, in the stationary situation of the economy there are up to
7 types of agents. In every period every type of agent faces the same prospects
that is why it is convenient to express their values in a recursive way. The
values of the agents, denoted v.., are expressed as discounted future proceeds
from production. The discount factor β is the same for the workers and the
firms.
In the case when all 7 possible types are present in the stationary state of
the economy the values are:
vfy = 1/2
(
2pi − (1− β(1− y)(1− a))β(1− y)(1− a) · vys −
(1− β(1− y)a)β(1− y)a · vos + (1− β(1− b))β(1− b) · vfs
)
+
β
(
(1− y)(1− a)(1− b) · vfy + (1− y)a(1− b) · vfo + y(1− b) · vfs
)
vfo = 1/2
(
2pi − (1− β(1− o))β(1− o) · vos + (1− β(1− b))β(1− b) · vfs
)
+
β
(
(1− o)(1− b) · vfo + o(1− b) · vfs
)
vfs = m ·
(
Y · vfy +O · vfo
)
+ (1−m)β(1− b) · vfs
vyf = 1/2
(
2pi − (1− β(1− b))β(1− b) · vfs + (1− β(1− y)(1− a)) ·
β(1− y)(1− a) · vys + (1− β(1− y)a)β(1− y)a · vos
)
+
β
(
(1− y)(1− a)(1− b) · vyf + (1− y)(1− a)b · vys +
(1− y)a(1− b) · vof + (1− y)ab · vos
)
vys = m · vyf + (1−m)β
(
(1− y)(1− a) · vys + (1− y)a · vos
)
vof = 1/2
(
2pi − (1− β(1− b))β(1− b) · vfs + (1− β(1− o))β(1− o) · vos
)
+
β
(
(1− o)(1− b) · vof + (1− o)b · vos
)
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vos = m · vof + (1−m)β(1− o) · vos
The value of exit is naturally considered to be 0.
Under the assumption that the Law of Large Numbers holds, in a match-
ing situation firms will face a young or an old worker with probabilities that
are proportional to the fractions of young and old unemployed workers. The
probabilities, and also the fractions of young and old workers in the pool of
unemployed workers, are denoted Y and O respectively.
The probabilities Y and O are endogenously determined in the model and
they can be expressed as follows
Y = dys/(dys + dos)
O = dos/(dys + dos) = 1− Y
where d.. are distribution fractions of workers of indicated types.
The system of value functions can be rewritten in a matrix form as
V · v = pi
where v′ = (vfy, vfo, vfs, vyf , vys, vof , vos), pi′ = (−pi,−pi, 0,−pi, 0,−pi, 0)
and V is the matrix implied by the system of equations. The matrix equation
can be analytically solved and we get the value functions dependent only on
parameters of the model.
v = V−1 · pi
The distribution of firms and workers across types
distr = (dfy, dfo, dfs, dyf , dys, dof , dos) evolves in time according to the vector
equation
distrt+1 = distrt ·Q
where Q is a transition matrix that describes movement of agents across the
states.
We are looking for a stationary distribution distr∗, i.e. distribution that is
stable in time
distr∗ = distr∗ ·Q.
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Since firms can never become workers and the workers can never become
firms the evolution of these two populations are independent, which means that
we look for two stationary distributions, one for firms and the other one for
workers. On the contrary we can not separate young and old workers since their
fractions are determined endogenously in the model.
Under the assumptions that the Law of Large Numbers holds the transition
matrices for firms and workers are QF and QW . The interpretation is that an
element qij ∈ Q is the probability that the next period the agent will be of type
j given that today he is of type i. The presented matrices are for the situation
where all the proposed matches are accepted.
QF =

(1− b)(1− y)(1− a) (1− b)(1− y)a (1− b)y + b
0 (1− b)(1− o) (1− b)o+ b
mY (1− b)(1− y)(1− a) mY (1−b)(1−y)a+
mO(1−b)(1−o)
mY (1−b)y+mO(1−b)o+
(1−m)(1−b)+b

QW=

(1− y)(1− a)(1− b) (1− y)(1− a)b+ y (1− y)a(1− b) (1− y)ab
m(1− y)(1− a)(1− b) m(1−y)(1−a)b+
(1−m)(1−y)(1−a)+y m(1− y)a(1− b) m(1−y)ab+(1−m)(1−y)a
0 o (1− o)(1− b) (1− o)b
0 o m(1− o)(1− b) m(1−o)b+
(1−m)(1−o)

The types are ordered fy, fo, fs in QF matrix and yf , ys, of , os in QW
matrix.
Because the probabilities Y and O are endogenous and they enter the com-
putation of the stationary distribution of the firms, the stationary distribution
of the workers has to be computed first.
3.2.3 Stable Equilibria
This section in detail describes what is understood, in the context of this model,
to be a stable equilibrium, and how different types of equilibria occur.
A set of agents’ matching strategies together with corresponding values form
a stable equilibrium if they constitute a Nash equilibrium and strategies are
evolutionary stable. This means that none of the agents has incentives to change
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their strategy, given the strategy of the other agents, and at the same time the
strategies are resistent to small invasions, i.e. if there exists a fraction ε of agents
that have decided to deviate in their strategy the agents playing the equilibrium
strategy do not find it profitable to join the group of deviants.
In the context of the model there are up to 7 types of agents in the sta-
tionary situation of the economy. But also fewer types can occur in the stable
equilibrium depending on the strategies of agents. For all the possible strategies
of agents we have to check whether they constitute a Nash equilibrium and then
check whether strategies leading to such equilibrium are evolutionary stable. It
is easy to see that, for example, some trivial Nash equilibria are a result of
strategies not stable from the evolutionary point of view.
The firms have 4 possible strategies3:
1. reject every worker they meet
2. accept only the match with young workers
3. accept only the match with old workers
4. accept match with both types of workers
The workers have 2 possible strategies:
1. reject every firm they meet
2. accept every firm they meet
These strategies can lead to several types of matchings. Each of the match-
ings can be characterized by the types of agents that exist in the matching.
When respecting the assumptions of the model, the candidates for equilibria
are4:
1. the matching consisting of types fs, ys and os
3Only pure strategies of agents are considered in this paper.
4Further on we will refer to the matchings based on the numbers assigned to them here.
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2. the matching consisting of types fs, ys, os, fo, and of
3. the matching consisting of types fs, ys, os, fo, of , fy, and yf
4. the matching consisting of types fs, ys, os, fy, and yf
Despite there are 16 possible combinations of the agents’ strategies, there are
no other than the 4 mentioned matchings that can occur. If the assumptions
of the model are respected, due to the exogenous exits, the non-matched firms
and workers must be always present.
Graphically we can represent the matchings as follows:
?>=<89:;3
?>=<89:;4 oo //
fy,fo,fs,
yf,ys,of,os @@¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡ ?>=<89:;2
^>^>>>>>>>>
?>=<89:;1
OO
+fo
of
@@¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡¡
+fy
yf
fs,ys,
os
^>^>>>>>>>>
The system of equations for the values of the types that has been described
in the previous section applies to matching 3. The rest of the matchings are less
complex. They can be described by similar systems of equations as is the one
that applies for matching 3. The systems of equations are simpler because some
types of agents that are not present in these matchings and the values of these
types of agents are therefore zero. Similarly the transition matrices have to be
adjusted to the fact that some of the types of agents do not exist in matchings
1, 2 and 4.
We consider the stationary situations of the above described matchings, i.e.
the situation when the values of the types of agents as well as the distribution
are stationary. A stationary matching is considered to be a stable equilibrium if
it is a Nash equilibrium with strategies that are evolutionary stable. It is easy
to see that, from the 4 candidates for stable equilibrium matchings, matching
1, even though it is Nash, results from the strategies that are not evolutionary
stable. It is because all the agents are non-matched and therefore their values are
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necessarily 0. By deviation to any of the strategies where the agents match they
will achieve positive value. Therefore matching 1 is never a stable equilibrium.
Matchings 2 and 4 are always Nash. The reasoning behind this is simple.
The firms in matchings 2 and 4 create only one type of match, i.e. they either
match with young workers or with old workers. Having a worker brings profit
so the value of the matched firm is higher than the value of the unmatched firm,
which only has prospects of being matched in the future. Strategic waiting for
a better match does not make any sense because the match that would come
would be the same as the existing one. Workers, no matter what their strategy
is, can end up only employed or unemployed. Since all the types of employment
are the same, due to the fact that firms are homogenous, the strategic waiting
for a better match can not be profitable and the value of being matched with a
firm is higher than the value of being unemployed. From these considerations we
can conclude that matchings 2 and 4 are always Nash. This is not always true
for matching 3 where the firms’ strategic waiting for a better match can play
a role. Therefore, for matching 3 we should verify for which sets of parameters
the model constitutes Nash equilibrium. After that the evolutionary stability
of the matching strategies has to be verified.
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When we focus on the evolutionary stability of the strategies we can see
that the strategy “reject every firm/worker” is not evolutionary stable neither
for firms nor for workers. These strategies imply the value of firms and workers
equal to zero. The firms and workers can always do better, i.e. have a positive
value, by deviating to any other strategy.
Since the agents have only two strategies one of which is not stable it leaves
them with the strategy of accepting every firm they meet. On the other hand
the firms have three strategies left. As a matter of fact each of them leads to
different type of matching. The strategy “accept only the match with young
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workers” implies matching 4, the strategy “accept only the match with old
workers” implies matching 2, and the strategy “accept match with both types
of workers” leads to matching 3. For these firms strategies the evolutionary
stability has to be verified because they can have incentives to deviate from one
to the remaining two, which would mean a deviation from one type of matching
to another one.
3.2.4 Multiple Stable Equilibria and Pareto Dominance
The theoretical matching model described in the previous sections has 5 param-
eters: m, y, a, o, and b. The goal is to describe how the existence of different
stable equilibria depend on the parameters of the model. Naturally, for a given
combination of the parameters, several stable equilibria can occur, i.e. parame-
ters are such, that several sets of agents’ strategies lead to Nash equilibria that
are also evolutionary stable. In this situation the question of Pareto dominance
of one equilibrium over another one occurs. It is important to notice that the
stationary equilibria are never directly comparable because they never consist
of the same types of agents. Therefore it is not enough to compare the value
of a certain type of agents in one equilibrium with the value of the same type
of agents in the other equilibrium. A Pareto dominating equilibrium, in the
context of this model, is such that all the values of firms and workers in this
equilibrium are higher that the values in another equilibrium. The condition,
though it seems rather strict, is a necessary one because the types of agents as
well as the distribution of agents in the two equilibria are different and there-
fore one type of agent in the first equilibrium can become a different type in the
other equilibrium5.
3.2.5 Social Optimality
The proposed model allows us to study social optimality of the equilibria implied
by the agents’ optimal decisions. Assume that in the model there exists a social
planner who’s goal is to maximize the aggregate welfare of the economy. Assume
5The agents can change their type of match, not their ex-ante type, i.e. it is enough to
compare the values for firms, young worker and old workers separately.
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the social planner has no means how to change the meeting technology in the
economy but he can influence agents’ decisions by imposing rules on what type
of match they have to accept and what type they have to reject. Moreover
he can force the agents to stay in the created matches until their exit. The
stability of matchings is therefore imposed on the agents. This implies that
the matchings that would be unstable from the point of view of agents can be
chosen as optimal by the social planner.
The task of the social planner is simple. For each combination of param-
eters of the model and for each of the matchings 1 - 4 described in section
3.2.3 he computes the stationary distributions and the values of the types of
agents. Using these he determines aggregate welfare Ω, which is defined as a
weighted average of the values of types of agents with the weights that are the
corresponding fractions of the distribution.
Ω = dfy · vfy + dfo · vfo + dfs · vfs + dyf · vyf + dys · vys + dof · vof + dos · vos
The agents’ decisions are then, for the given combination of parameters,
considered to be socially optimal if the set of equilibria stable under the given
combination of parameters contains the stationary matching preferred by the
planner.
In cases where the social optimum differs from the optima chosen by agents
the natural question one can ask is whether the planner’s solution is Pareto
improving for the agents.
By the same argument as in the previous section, the matchings are directly
incomparable among each other because in every comparison at least one type
of agents is missing or is redundant. Moreover, the distribution of agents in each
of these matchings is completely different so it is not clear whether the agent
of a certain type under one matching will be of the same type under the other
matching. The only possibility how to make sure that one matching is Pareto
improving when compared with another matching is to make sure that all the
values of types of agents in one matching are lower than all the values in the
other matching.
A simple conclusion that can be made without any computation is that
matching 4, though it theoretically can be socially optimal, can never be Pareto
improving because in this matching the value of the old workers, because they
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are never matched with firms, is zero. On the other hand the values of the old
workers in matchings 2 and 3 are positive, which follows from the fact that their
probability of being employed is non-zero.
3.3 Results
The stationary distributions as well as the values of types of agents in each of
the 4 matchings mentioned in section 3.2.3 can be analytically expressed as the
functions of parameters of the model. The values are homogenous of degree 1
in pi.
Although analytical expressions for value functions and also fractions of dis-
tributions can be obtained the expression are very complex and therefore an-
alytical comparative statics would be tedious. That is why some parts of the
following sections rely on numeric computations for particular combinations of
parameters.
First, the stationary distributions has to be obtained. By a simple fixed
point argument the stationary distributions exist and are unique6 for all well
defined transition matrices, which is the case of the transition matrices described
in the theoretical section of the paper. The stationary distribution of workers
has to be computed first because the fractions of non-matched young and old
workers enter the computation of the stationary distribution of the firms.
Once the stationary distributions are obtained the results enter the compu-
tation of the values of types of agents. The analytical solutions can be obtained
but due to their complexity the analysis that follows is based on the results of a
computation of the values for each particular combination of the parameters of
the model. In the computation the profit pi is fixed and is equal to 1. Since the
values are homogenous of degree 1 in pi this choice of the numeric value of pi is
not restrictive. The discount factor is β = 0.95, which is a standard value. The
computation is performed for different fixed values of m, y, o, a, and b. Since
the model assumes that o > y all the computations take that into account. For
the parameters a, and b only three values are considered: 0.1, 0.5, and 0.9, i.e.
6The theoretical background of stationary distributions discussed in detail can be found in
Stokey, Lucas, and Prescott [12].
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these probabilities are either low, medium or high. The probability of matching
m can take 11 values between zero and one. And the probabilities of exit y and
o take up to 51 values, i.e. the aim is to describe the dependence of the results
on these parameters as if they were continuous variables.
3.3.1 Results of Agents’ Optimal Decisions:
Agents strategies may lead to 4 possible types of equilibria. For each of the 4
cases we have to check whether the strategies lead to a Nash equilibrium and if
yes then whether they are evolutionary stable.
As already discussed in section 3.2.3, matchings 1, 2, and 4 are always Nash
equilibria and the matching 1 is never evolutionary stable.
The computations done for each particular combination of the parameters
of the model show the following. Matching 3 is not a Nash equilibrium in the
cases when the probability of being matched is very high, i.e. the parameter m
is close to one, and the probabilities of exit of workers y and o are low. The
intuition behind this result is simple. Meetings are common, therefore the firms
can afford to strategically reject some matches because it is probable that they
will not wait too long for a new match and therefore will not lose profits from
many periods. Also, since the workers of both types stay in the economy for a
relatively long time the profit lost due to strategic waiting will be compensated
after creation of a match as the match should, in expected terms, produce for
quite a long time.
Each of the matching 2, 3, and 4 is stable equilibrium under a range of
parameters. Multiple stable equilibria occur. Matching 2 coexists for a range
of parameters with matching 3, and for a different range of parameters with
matching 4, we denote these multiple equilibria as (2, 3) and (2, 4). There is a
range of parameters under which none of the matchings is stable. This happens
for the range of parameters where matching 3 is not Nash and agents have always
incentives to deviate from matching 2 to matching 4 and back from matching 4
to matching 2. We denote this unstable situation as situation 0.
The stable equilibria together with the parameters that are characteristic
for them are briefly summarized Table 3.1. A detailed summary is provided in
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the Appendix in Table 3.4.
Stable equilibria Characteristic parameters
2,3 very high m, high a, low b, high y, o
2,4 ∀ a,b,m except very low m, low y, o
2 high m,∀ a,b, very low y, o
3 ∀ a,b,m, medium and high y, o
4 very high m, low a, ∀ b, low y, o
0 very high m, low a, ∀ b, very low y, o
Table 3.1: Stable equilibria
In general we can conclude that for the agents’ decisions the parameter m
plays the most important role. For very low values of m it is stable equilibrium
3 that prevails independently of the values of other parameters of the model.
It is a consequence of the fact that meetings are rare and therefore firms prefer
to take any worker rather than strategically wait. As the probability of being
matched m grows the strategic waiting for a better match may become a prof-
itable strategy because the loss of profits due to the waiting is not substantial.
For the exposition purposes we fix several parameters of the model in order
to discuss the intuition behind results but the full analysis is provided in the
Appendix.
Let us focus on the stationary state of the economy where meetings are
common, i.e. m is high, and young workers rarely die and firms almost never
go bankrupt, i.e. probabilities y and b are very low. In this situation matchings
2 and 4 are stable for lower range of probability o and matching 3 is stable for
high values of probability o. When probability of exit of old workers o is high,
the difference between old and young workers is significant. Both types can
be profitable for firms. Young bring longevity to production pairs, old bring
high one-period profits for firms through the bargaining procedure. Moreover,
replacing workers is relatively easy and therefore firms have no reason not to
take every worker that they meet, which implies matching 3.
For the low probabilities of exit of old workers o the situation is different.
Young and old workers are not very different. Young workers don’t bring signif-
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icant improvement of lifetime of a pair compared to old workers, old workers on
the other hand don’t bring significantly higher profits to firms through bargain-
ing. Depending on which of these two sources of profit weighs more in the value
of firms, the firms will prefer only one type of workers. As it turns out, when
the probability o is close to zero, it is the old workers that firms will choose
to employ, and therefore matching 2 is a stable equilibrium. When probability
o increases, the firms will prefer young workers and they will fire workers once
they age; therefore matching 4 is stable equilibrium. There is a significant range
of parameters where both matchings 2 and 4 are stable. For very high values
of probability of meeting m matchings 2 and 4 become unstable in a sense that
agents have incentives to deviate from matching 2 to matching 4 and then back
to matching 2. It is caused by the fact that values of firms with and without
workers in these two matchings are almost the same, which is a consequence of
the fact that firms almost never go bankrupt and meetings are common. For
firms it is profitable to deviate in their strategy and start to employ the opposite
type of worker than any other firm. The deviation in their strategy brings them
higher value than the values of other firms, but this increased value is only a
consequence of the fact that they have decided to employ the type of workers no
other firm employed, and therefore such a worker was easy to meet. Once all the
firms repeat the deviating strategy their value is driven down by higher scarcity
of unemployed. This reasoning makes firms unstable between two strategies.
Because we have assumed that identical firms use identical strategies and we
considered only pure strategies, under these assumptions we obtain a region of
parameters for which matching 3 is not Nash and matchings 2 and 4 are Nash
but not stable.
Despite the fact that in the explanation above we have focused on a particu-
lar range of parameters the full range has been explored and table summarizing
all the results can be found in the Appendix. Illustrative plots of the equilibria
discussed above can also be found in the Appendix.
In situations of multiple equilibria Pareto dominance of one of the equilibria
never occurs.
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3.3.2 Results of Planner’s Optimal Decisions:
In the planner’s problem, when studying what is the socially optimal matching
we obtain that three of the 4 possible matchings can be socially optimal. Nat-
urally, matching 1 is excluded from the debate as this matching implies values
zero for all types of agents and therefore is never optimal from the point of view
neither of agents nor the planner.
Interestingly enough we observe that only rarely the stable equilibrium
matching chosen by the agents coincides with the matching chosen by the plan-
ner. While in the case of agents’ choice stable equilibrium 3 is the most common,
in the case of the planner’s choice equilibrium 3 is the rarest choice.
Socially optimal equilibria are never Pareto improving7 for the agents. The
intuition behind this, concerning the equilibrium 4, is obvious. Since in equi-
librium 4 only young agents are working the value of the old agents, which are
non-matched and have no prospects to be matched, is zero. In every other type
of equilibria their value is positive as the implication of the fact that with a
certain probability they can be matched. That’s why the planner’s choice of
equilibrium 4 must be always Pareto inferior to the agents’ choice as at least
the old agents are necessarily better off in any other type of matching.
Another reason why the planner’s choice is Pareto inferior to the agent’s
choice is the following. Agent’s often choose equilibrium 3 where every type of
worker can work. At the same time the planner chooses usually matching 4 or
2, where one type of workers does not work. The case of matching 4 has been
already discussed. For the case of matching 2 a similar argument can be used.
In this matching only the old workers are working. Therefore the value of the
young workers comes from the fact that with some probability they will age and
they will be employed. Of course, the young workers in matching 3 do not wait
and can be employed directly in the given period, moreover their bargaining
power over the splitting of the proceeds from production is higher than the
bargaining power of the old workers, which implies higher one-period profit and
therefore all this sums up to higher value of a young worker in matching 3 than
in matching 2.
7They are not a Pareto improvement of any alternative
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Table 3.2 summarizes the types of socially non-optimal choices the agents
make.
Socially suboptimal equilibria
Agents’ choice Planner’s choice
2,4 3
2 3
4
3 2
4
4 2
3
0 2
4
Table 3.2: Socially suboptimal choices of agents
The planner’s choice of equilibria depends on several factors. The equilib-
rium fractions of agents are the first factor and the values of agents are the
second factor. The planner does not care about division of profits between
members of pairs, because both members of the pair contribute to the econ-
omy’s wealth. The planner on the other hand cares about the lifetime of pairs.
It is also important to realize that the fraction of old agents plays an important
role in establishing social optimum in the economy. This fraction is endogenous
and changes with types of matching and changes in parameters of the model.
The planner chooses equilibrium 2, i.e. the equilibrium with only old workers
employed, as the socially optimal in the cases when the probability of meeting
m is high and typically for the lower range of values of the probability of exit
of the old workers o. Because the probability of exit of young workers is lower
than the probability of exit of old workers, the differences between the workers
are not substantial. Because the workers have low probability of exit their
value whether matched or not is relatively high. Moreover, the young workers
even though they are not working have value implied by the fact that at some
point they will age and therefore will be able to find a firm to work for. All
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these factors together imply that matching 2 with only old workers employed is
socially optimal.
The range of the parameters y and o for which equilibrium 2 is socially opti-
mal gets larger when parameter a increases. The intuition is simple. Parameter
a is in the model responsible for ageing of the young workers. If this parameter
increases it means that the endogenous fraction of the old agents in the economy
increases, which means that the firms meet the old agents even more often than
before.
The planner chooses equilibrium 4 as the social optimum typically when
meetings are rare, i.e. the probability m is low, and the probability of exit y is
in a lower range. The firms find it more profitable to employ a young worker
with whom they will produce for many periods because with an old worker they
would be forced to replace him soon, but the search takes a long time and means
big loss of profits.
Matching 4 is also socially optimal in the cases when the probability of exit of
old workers o is high, independent of the probability of matching m. Naturally
in these cases the matching with young workers brings higher welfare of the
economy because they guarantee long expected lifetime of producing pairs.
Equilibrium 3 is rarely socially optimal. The parameters typical for this
equilibrium are a, b and y low. The range in which this equilibrium is socially
lies between the areas of equilibrium 2 and equilibrium 4.
A brief summary of the socially optimal equilibria is provided in Table 3.3.
Planner’s equilibria Characteristic parameters
2 m high; o, y low
3 m high; a, b, y low
4 m low; y low
y high
o high
Table 3.3: Socially optimal equilibria
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3.4 Final Remarks
In the model of worker-firm matching it is desirable not only to allow for hiring
and firing decisions of the firms but also to allow for job-to-job transitions,
i.e. workers and firms should continue to search even when they are already
matched. In the context of the model presented in this paper, because the firms
are homogenous, the workers never have incentives to leave the existing match.
Therefore if we want to study the job-to job transitions of the workers we have
to assume heterogeneity of the firms. It can be done by extending the proposed
model by assuming 2 or more types of firms.
Another interesting extension of the model is to allow firms to hire more
than one worker but then we are departing from the classical setting of the
two-sided matching models and the analysis may get much more complicated
than in the presented model.
The last extension, bringing more realism into the model, would be to assume
a more realistic structure of ageing, i.e. to assume a Markov process that would
guarantee that young workers age for sure after staying young for a certain
number of periods. This extension brings serious computational complications
to the model. We would have to take into account that there are several types
of young workers depending on their “distance” from the period when they age.
On the other hand Markov probabilities of ageing and of exit would bring a lot
of realism into the model and it would be interesting to see hiring and firing
decisions of firms especially those concerned workers of relatively old age but
not close to exit.
3.5 Conclusions
The paper studies the stationary situation of the matching market in an econ-
omy with firms and workers that are ageing. In this economy the agents’ opti-
mal profit maximizing decisions can lead to several types of stable equilibrium
matching. All theoretically possible stable matchings turn out to be the stable
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equilibrium of the model for a certain range of parameters. Multiple stable equi-
libria occur but within the coexisting equilibria there is no Pareto dominance
of one over the other. There exists a small range of parameters for which none
of the matching is stable.
The optimal behavior of the agents can be summarized as follows. For the
lower probabilities of meeting a potential partner agents tend to accept every
proposed match. For the higher probabilities of meeting the profit extractions
from the bargaining procedure play a significant role and therefore some of the
proposed matches are rejected. There exits a range of parameters where firms
employ only young workers and they fire them once they age, but also a range
of parameters where firms employ only old workers.
The proposed model suggests that the individual profit-maximizing behavior
often leads to the matchings that are suboptimal from the point of view of the
social planner maximizing the general welfare of the economy. This is a direct
implication of the fact that the social planner does not care about the division of
the profits within pairs. Socially optimal matchings are never Pareto improving
for the agents.
The results of this paper suggest that the presence of the social planner in
the organization of matching markets may be beneficial for the overall welfare
of the economy if the planner is able to impose matchings that are not stable
equilibria from the point of view of individual agents.
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3.A Appendix
3.A.1 Summary of the Equilibria
The following table summarizes the multiple as well as unique stable equilibria
implied by agents’ decision and provides approximate intervals for the param-
eters under which the equilibria occur. The intervals of parameters are only
the estimates done based on the plots done for 99 combinations of values of
the parameters a, b, and m and plotted for the approximation of a continuous
range of the parameters o and y, where o ≥ y. When an area of parameters
is described by an inequality it is always understood that the parameters must
satisfy also the conditions that they are from the interval [0, 1]. In the table
below the following notation is used. The arrow ↘ means that the parameter
is going down, while the arrow ↗ means that the parameter is going up. When
talking about parameters y and o, the threshold values are considered.
Coexisting Values of the parameters
equilibria m a b o, y (y≤o)
2,3 0.999 0.5 0.1 ∀ y,o: o≥0.8, y≥0.6, y≤0.75o
0.9 0.1 ∀ y,o: y,o≥0.5, y≤0.7o+0.15
2,4 0.3 0.1, 0.5 ∀ ∀ y,o: y,o≤0.1
0.4 0.1, 0.5 ∀ ∀ y,o: y,o≤0.15
0.5 ∀ ∀ ∀ y,o: o≤0.25, y≤-o+0.25
0.6-0.9 ∀ ∀ ∀ y,o: y≤-o+0.1+0.5(m-0.5)
o∈[0.05,0.3], y≥-o+0.05
y,o↗ with a↗, y,o↘ with b↗
0.999 0.1 0.1 ∀ y,o: o≥0.65, y≤0.5
0.5, 0.9 ∀ y,o: o≥0.65, y≤3o-2, y≤0.8
0.5, 0.9 0.1 ∀ y,o: y≥-o+0.2,y≤0.6
0.5, 0.9 ∀ y,o: y≥-o+0.2, y≤0.9
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Coexisting Values of the parameters
equilibria m a b o, y (y≤o)
2 0.6 0.1 0.1 ∀ y,o: y,o≤0.05
0.7, 0.8 0.1 ∀ ∀ y,o: o≤0.15+(m-0.7)0.5, o↘ with b↗
y≤-o+0.15+(m-0.7)0.5
0.9 0.1, 0.5 ∀ ∀ y,o: o≤0.1, y≤-o+0.1
0.999 0.1, 0.9 ∀ ∀ y,o: y, o ≤0.05
0.5 ∀ ∀ y,o: o≤0.25, y≤-o+0.25
3 0.001-0.2 ∀ ∀ ∀o , ∀y≤o
0.3 0.1, 0.5 ∀ o≥0.1, ∀y
0.9 ∀ ∀o , ∀y≤o
0.4 0.1, 0.5 ∀ o≥0.15, ∀y
0.9 ∀ ∀o , ∀y≤o
0.5-0.9 ∀ ∀ ∀ y,o: y≥-o+0.1+0.5(m-0.5)
y,o↗ with a↗, y,o↘ with b↗
0.999 ∀ ∀ ∀ y,o: y, o ≥0.5
4 0.9 0.1 0.1 ∀ y,o: o≤0.4, y≥-o+0.3, y≤-o+0.5
0.5 ∀ y,o: y≥-o+0.2, y≤-o+0.7, y≥4o-1.8
0.9 ∀ y,o: y≥-o+0.2, y≤-0.5o+1, y≥o-0.35
0.999 0.1 0.1 ∀ y,o: y≥-o+0.3, y≤0.5, o≤0.65
0.5, 0.9 ∀ y,o: y≥-o+0.3, y≥3o-2, y≤0.8
0 0.9 0.1 0.1 ∀ y,o: y≤-o+0.3, y≥-o+0.1
0.5 ∀ y,o: y≤-o+0.2, y≥-o+0.1
0.999 0.1 ∀ ∀ y,o: y≤-o+0.3, o,y≥ 0.05
Table 3.4: Agents’ optimal choice
3.A.2 Plots of Equilibria
This section contains illustrative plots of stable equilibria implied by individual
decisions as well as the social planner’s equilibria. On each of the plots on the
left hand side we have the plot of agents’ equilibria and on the right hand side
the plot of the planner’s equilibria. The plots are done for fixed values of the
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parameters b = 0.001, and y = 0.001, i.e. firms almost never go bankrupt, young
agents almost never die, and for the whole ranges of the parameters o and m.
The values of probability of ageing a are stated on the plots. For each possible
combination of parameters the type of equilibrium is computed and then it is
plotted in the color reserved for that particular type of equilibria. The table
preceding the plots should help orientation among different types of equilibria
in both agents’ and the planner’s problem.
On the horizontal axis we have the parameter o, the vertical axis represents
the parameter m.
Different types of equilibria are distinguished by different colors as follows:
Agents’ choice Planner’s choice 
2,3 
2,4 
2 
3 
4 
0 
2 
3 
4 
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